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RETHINKING UCITA: LESSONS FROM THE OPEN
SOURCE MOVEMENT
Open source software is an idea whose time has finally come. For twenty years it has
been building momentum in the technical cultures that built the Internet and the
World Wide Web. Now it’s breaking out into the commercial world, and that’s
changing all the rules. Are you ready?1

I. INTRODUCTION
For those within the information technology (IT) industry, the phrase “open
source” has been as prominent at water cooler and boardroom discussions over the last
several years as the phrase “out source.” Open source is at once a software development model, a business model, a social movement, and a philosophy that has recently
garnered attention from outside of the IT sphere. As such, the topic has become
increasingly fertile ground for academic scholarship from several disciplines.
Economists, legal academics and practitioners, computer engineers, and social
commentators have offered their varying perspectives on open source software.
Whether or not this attention is warranted, and whether or not this is truly “an idea
whose time has finally come,” remains unclear. In fact, clarity and certainty are not
adjectives that fit the open source movement particularly well. Indeed, from a legal
perspective, there are more questions than answers in this area at present. Despite
these legal uncertainties, some open source software projects have flourished in the
United States and abroad. Several open source software projects also serve as critical
infrastructure for the World Wide Web.
Beyond open source software specifically, there are also numerous and important
questions about the legitimacy and enforceability of mass-market software license
agreements in general. Courts that have been asked to interpret these agreements have
offered various approaches and conclusions. Some courts have applied Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to these transactions; others have held that it does
not apply. Given the increasing importance of computer software in our economy and
the widespread use of these license agreements, consistent and uniform rules would be
desirable.
A recent effort to codify uniform rules to govern software licenses appears to be
languishing. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) recently proposed the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA) for adoption by all the states. At present, only two states have adopted
UCITA and the prevailing logic suggests that further adoption will be an uphill
struggle. In large part, UCITA was controversial because it was perceived as overly
protective of large commercial computer software developers–most notably, Microsoft.
A diverse and energetic collection of interests, aligned against UCITA, has succeeded
thus far in derailing its progress. Although the argument that Microsoft is hampered
by a lack of uniformity and certainty in the law is not likely to engender a great deal
of sympathy, that same argument in the context of open source software might be more

1. Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
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convincing. In this Comment, I argue that the open source movement necessitates a
rethinking of UCITA, or at least a UCITA-like uniform code to govern software
licensing transactions. If UCITA benefits the open source movement, then former
opponents may be willing to take another look at the statute.
Part II of this Comment offers some basics of software programming and the
relevance of those basics to the open source approach. Part III provides some
background by introducing the legal protection for computer software under existing
intellectual property laws. Part IV builds on this legal background by examining the
evolution of the software licensing regime. Courts have failed to offer consistent
guidance in this area of the law. Part V explores the trials and tribulations of UCITA,
from its earliest stages to its current static existence. Part VI provides a general
introduction to the open source movement, including a discussion of the various open
source licenses that are currently being used. What started as a limited group of
academic and hobbyist programmers sharing source code has become a prominent
landmark on the software development landscape. Open source software now serves
as the foundation of several successful businesses. A brief overview of the various
open source licenses is also included in this section. Part VII includes a discussion of
the legal uncertainties facing the open source movement and speculation on the extent
to which these uncertainties might be limiting broader participation in the open source
approach. Part VII also offers a brief analysis of the impact that UCITA might have
with regard to the open source movement and a discussion of what lessons might be
learned by thinking about UCITA and open source software simultaneously. For a
number of reasons, a rethinking of UCITA, in light of the open source movement as
well as some important amendments to UCITA itself, leads to the conclusion that
UCITA should now be adopted by the states.
II. SOFTWARE PROGRAMMING 101: SOME BASICS
In order to better understand the legal issues raised by the development of open
source software, it is appropriate to provide a brief introduction to the technology of
software programming. The term “source” in “open source” refers to source code.
Source code is the language that programmers use to both speak to computers and
command them to execute desired functions.2 Source code has been described as the
“holy grail” of the open source movement.3 Actually, it is technically incorrect to say
that programmers speak directly to computers because computers do not directly read
nor respond to source code. Programmers and computers do not speak the same
language.4 Computers respond to another type of language, usually referred to as
“object code” or “executable code.”5 Object code is a binary language of consecutive
ones and zeros that controls on/off switches in the computer hardware.6 Programmers

2. See Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in Intellectual Property Law? The Case Against Open
Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶¶ 8-9.
3. Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563,
578.
4. See Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability of
Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 7 (2000).
5. See Strasser, supra note 2, at ¶ 12.
6. Shawn W. Potter, Opening Up to Open Source, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 24, ¶ 7 (2000).
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use a number of different programming languages to write source code, all of which
are readable and understood by humans.7 These programming languages are the
expressive medium through which programmers dictate the desired function of a
program. The source code is then translated into the computer-readable object code
before the computer is able to respond to the commands of the programmer.8 This
process is called compilation.9
This distinction between source code and object code is an important one because
it lies at the heart of what distinguishes traditional proprietary software from open
source software.10 The key difference between open source software and proprietary
software lies in the development and distribution method. Traditionally, commercial
software developers have utilized the proprietary model, distributing software in object
code form only and keeping the source code secret.11 Open source proponents have
sharply criticized this model of software distribution on both moral and practical
grounds, supporting free and open access to source code.12 They liken the proprietary
distribution model to selling a car with the hood welded shut.13 A car buyer in this
situation would have no way of knowing how the car operates and would be unable to
repair any internal problems themselves. Although many, if not most, car owners care
little about what is under the hood, never mind being able to make their own repairs,
there are some that would at least like to have this option. This too is the case with

7. “Software programmers write software programs using a high level computer language such as
BASIC, C++, or Java. These high level languages generally use English alphanumeric characters and
symbols and enable the developer to tell the computer what to do.” Christian H. Nadan, Open Source
Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 349, 350 (2002).
8. Id. at 350-51. For a particularly effective and comprehensive explanation of software programming
technology see Vetter, supra note 3, at 578-82.
9. Nadan, supra note 7, at 350-51. “The compilation of software is an automated task that is usually
carried out by standardized compiler software . . . . [C]ompilation of source code into object code is a oneway process.” Strasser, supra note 2, ¶ 8.
10. “The different characteristics of source code and object code and their unique relationship create
a powerful incentive for software producers to offer consumers only the object code of their programs and
to keep the source code confidential.” Strasser, supra note 2, ¶ 10.
11. “Most license agreements for commercial software prevent the licensee/user from having access
to the source code.” Dennis M. Kennedy, A Primer on Open Source Licensing Legal Issues: Copyright,
Copyleft and Copyfuture, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 345, 346 (2001). One reason why software
developers have preferred to restrict access to source code is “[i]f software were distributed in source code
form, any skilled engineer could take and reuse the innovative or labor-intensive parts of the program in
that engineer’s own competing program.” Nadan, supra note 7, at 351. Nadan also discusses the fact that
a software developer can seek trade secret protection for the code, but only if it remains secret. He writes,
“[o]ne important way of keeping the source code secret is to distribute only object code copies of the
program.” Id. at 351-52.
12. “As a philosophical matter, computer programs were not meant to be ‘owned’ by a single source;
as a practical matter, programs so produced and owned were likely to be functionally inferior; as a cultural
matter, communication and collaboration among technologists ought not to be circumscribed.” Michael J.
Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 284 (2003).
13. One author explains:
For someone who simply wants to run the program, the source code is unnecessary.
However, for someone who wants to do anything else, the source code is generally required.
Engineers often compare having the source code to having the ability to open the hood of
a car, see how the engine works, and work on it.
Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 27-28 (2000).
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respect to software. Most software users don’t care at all about what the source code
looks like, they merely want to run the program. However, much like the do-ityourself mechanics, there is a substantial (and vocal) contingent of programmers—
professionals and hobbyists—that want to peek under the hood and get their hands
greasy with the source code. Accordingly, open source software is developed by
programmers who share their source code with each other and distribute their software
with the source code freely available.
One author explains that “[a] fundamental tenet of Open Source software is that
the licensee/user must get both the access to source code and, more important, the right
to make changes to the source code to correct defects and bugs, customize programs
or add features as the licensee/user deems appropriate.”14 Access to the source code
and the ability to make changes and improvements are essential aspects of the open
source approach and are what distinguish open source software from proprietary
software.
III. SOFTWARE AS PROPERTY
The United States Constitution grants Congress the authority “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”15 It is this
constitutional authority that is the basis for intellectual (i.e., not tangible) property
protection of software via copyright and patent law. This constitutional authorization
reflects a primarily utilitarian justification for intellectual property protection. We do
not recognize and protect intellectual property because it is the natural right of the
author/inventor; we recognize intellectual property because it serves the general
welfare by stimulating progress in science and the useful arts.16 Property rights in
intellectual creations provide an economic incentive for authors, inventors, and even
computer programmers to create new works and inventions. It must, however, be
recognized that, at least in the United States, this incentive is not an end in itself. It is
merely a means to a greater end: to provide the public with creative works and useful
inventions.17 In the context of copyright protection, Justice Stewart articulated this
rationale by saying:

14. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 346.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. For a thoughtful article considering the normative underpinnings of copyright law, see generally
Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1278 (2003).
17. The utilitarian justification for intellectual property protection subscribed to by the United States
stands in contrast to a natural right rationale of the continental European countries. Garon explains:
[T]he U.S. Copyright Act is geared towards promoting innovation and a healthy information
industry by providing sufficient incentives to potential creators, while at the same time
preserving a “robust” public domain.
....
Unlike the United States, continental-European “authors’ rights” are based primarily
on notions of natural justice: “authors’ rights are not created by law but always existed in
the legal consciousness of man.” In the pure droit d’auteur philosophy, copyright is an
essentially unrestricted natural right reflecting the “sacred” bond between the author and his
personal creation.
Id. at 1301 (footnote omitted).
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The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an “author’s” creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. “The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly,” [the Supreme] Court has said, “lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.”18

Software is now treated as intellectual property, and as such, the owner of that
property has certain property rights that are recognized and protected by law. The
limited scope of that protection, however, is a reflection of the ongoing balance
between the rights of the author/inventor and the public interest.
A. Copyright Protection for Computer Software
Software has not always been protected as intellectual property. Section 102 of
the Copyright Act provides that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”19 Historically, copyright
had been used to protect authors of literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works, but
in the early days of computer programming, copyright did not extend to software. As
technology has progressed, however, copyright protection has been extended to new
and different modes of expression, including software.20 In 1980, Congress passed the
Computer Software Copyright Act, which added a definition of “computer program”
to the federal copyright statute.21 Since that time, courts have generally agreed that
computer programs are considered “literary works” and are copyright protected.22
The more difficult issue, however, has been determining the precise scope of that
protection. At the very least, copyright protects the source code as well as the object
code of a computer program.23 But, section 102(b) of the Copyright Act specifically
limits the scope of protection for all works by providing that “[i]n no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of

18. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
20. In 1976 Congress passed amendments to the Copyright Act. “The Act’s legislative history
suggested that programs were copyrightable as literary works.” COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL
INFORMATION ECONOMY 241 (2002).
21. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 38, sec. 211, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980).
22. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Whelan Assocs.,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that copyright protection extends to both source code and
object code). These cases are collected and discussed in COHEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 243-55.
23. “[A] computer program, whether in object code or source code, is a ‘literary work’ and is protected
from unauthorized copying, whether from its object or source code version.” Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1249.
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the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”24
Historically, distinguishing between copyrightable expression and unprotected ideas,
processes, or methods of operation has proven difficult. When faced with this challenge in the seminal case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., Judge Learned Hand
declared that “[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
can.”25 Nonetheless, Judge Hand assumed that challenge and articulated an “abstraction” analysis to be applied on a case-by-case basis.26 Judge Hand’s abstraction test
has become a standard analysis for distinguishing idea from expression in computer
software.27
In 1986, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with a copyright
infringement action concerning a software program that was written to manage a dental
laboratory.28 Because the alleged infringing program was not written in the same
programming language as the original program,29 this was not a case of literal copying.
Thus, the critical question was the extent to which the original program’s non-literal
aspects (e.g., structure, sequence, and organization) were protected by copyright.30
Foregoing Judge Hand’s abstraction analysis, the Court instead looked to another
seminal case—Baker v. Selden31—to determine the scope of copyright protection for
the computer program.32 The Court reasoned that “the line between idea and expression may be drawn with reference to the end sought to be achieved” and that “the
purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s idea, and everything that
is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea.”33 The Court moved on to narrowly define the purpose of this particular
computer program as the “efficient organization of a dental laboratory,”34 leaving
plenty of room for copyright protection of non-literal aspects of the program, such as

24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
25. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
26. Judge Hand explained that:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times
might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are
no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
Id.
27. See Bryan Seigworth, Note and Comment, Injuring Competition and Impeding the Progress of
Science: Why Bowers v. Baystate Technologies Was Wrongly Decided, 23 J.L. & COM. 205, 209 (2004).
See also, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he theoretic
framework for analyzing substantial similarity expounded by Learned Hand in the Nichols case is helpful
in the present context.”).
28. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
29. Id. at 1226.
30. “The question therefore arises whether mere similarity in the overall structure of programs can be
the basis for a copyright infringement, or, put differently, whether a program’s copyright protection covers
the structure of the program or only the program’s literal elements, i.e., its source and object codes.” Id.
at 1233-34.
31. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
32. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986).
33. Id. at 1236 (emphasis omitted).
34. Id. at 1240.
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structure, sequence, and organization. The broad protection offered by the Third
Circuit’s analysis has been both applauded and criticized.35
Six years later, in Computer Associates, International v. Altai, Inc., the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Whelan analysis,36 and applied a modified
abstraction test.37 This modified test involved (1) analyzing the program from various
levels of abstractions, (2) filtering out all unprotected elements (such as elements
dictated by efficiency, interoperability or other external limitations), and (3) comparing
the remaining parts of the original program with the allegedly infringing program for
substantial similarity.38 This analysis provides a decidedly more narrow scope of
copyright protection for a program’s non-literal aspects.39
Debating the merits of the differing approaches used by the Second and Third
Circuits is beyond the purview of this paper. Nonetheless, the scope of copyright
protection for computer software is a major concern for both proprietary and open
source software developers. It dictates what aspects of a program are off limits as
copyrightable expression, and what aspects are fair game for a future developer to
copy. To some extent, the analysis of the scope of copyright protection should be
informed by balancing the author’s creative rights with the public interest in access.
A narrower scope of protection, represented by the abstraction, filtration, comparison
analysis, provides greater public access, whereas a broader scope of protection inhibits
public access. For utilitarian works, such as computer software, there may be a more
limited need for broad copyright protection as an incentive provider. By their very
nature, utilitarian works have their own built-in incentives.
Copyright protection secures to the author of a software program a bundle of
exclusive rights, including the right to make copies of the program, the right to prepare
derivative works, and the right to distribute literal copies or derivative works by sale,
lease or other modes of transfer.40 These rights, however, are subject to some very

35. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 978, 996-98
(supporting the Third Circuit’s analysis); Strasser, supra note 2, ¶¶ 28-29 (criticizing the Third Circuit for
offering overly broad copyright protection).
36. “We think that Whelan’s approach to separating idea from expression in computer programs relies
too heavily on metaphysical distinctions and does not place enough emphasis on practical considerations.”
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
37. “While the abstractions test was originally applied in relation to literary works such as novels and
plays, it is adaptable to computer programs.” Id. at 706-07.
38. Id. at 706. Judge Walker explains the court’s abstraction, filtration, comparison approach:
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this approach, a court would first break down the
allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts. Then, by examining each
of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas, expression that is necessarily incidental
to those ideas, and elements that are taken from the public domain, a court would then be
able to sift out all non-protectable material. Left with a kernel, or possible kernels, of
creative expression after following this process of elimination, the court’s last step would
be to compare this material with the structure of an allegedly infringing program. The result
of this comparison will determine whether the protectable elements of the programs at issue
are substantially similar so as to warrant a finding of infringement.
Id.
39. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has followed the lead of the Second
Circuit. See Autoskill, Inc., v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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specific statutory limitations.41 These limitations represent a codification of the
attempted balance between protection of the author’s rights and the rights of the
general public. They include the right to ‘fair use’ of a copyrighted work.42 Section
107 of the Copyright Act provides that “the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”43 Congressional codification of the fair use doctrine
signifies the belief that, in certain circumstances, society’s interest in free and unrestricted access to copyrighted works outweighs the author’s exclusive rights to control
that work.44
In the context of computer software, at least some courts have held that decompilation of object code may be a ‘fair use.’45 Decompilation, as the term itself suggests,
is the reversal of the process of compilation; that is, turning object code back into
source code.46 Also known as reverse engineering, this process is often critical for

Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
41. Note that section 106 of the Copyright Act begins with the phrase “[s]ubject to sections 107
through 121 . . . .” Id.
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
43. Id.
44. Pursuant to section 107, courts are advised to consider four factors in determining whether a
particular use is a fair use: “the purpose and character of the use, . . . the nature of the copyrighted work . . .
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, [and] the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Id. These are not the sole
factors that may be considered by courts in making a fair use determination, but they are the only factors
listed in section 107. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The
statutory factors are not exclusive.”).
45. See, e.g., id. at 1527-28. (“We conclude that where [decompilation] is the only way to gain access
to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a
legitimate reason for seeking such access, [decompilation] is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter
of law.”).
46. Strasser advises that decompilation is more complicated than one might suspect. He contends that
“once a piece of source code has been translated into object code, it is virtually impossible to translate it
back into the original source code.” Strasser, supra note 2, at 8. He explains:
Software firms do offer decompilers, which attempt to reverse engineer object code, but
while decompilers frequently generate source code which, when recompiled, leads to object
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software programmers writing code that will interoperate with other programs.47 By
reverse engineering the protected code of a software program, the programmer reveals
its technical requirements and can create a program that will meet and work with these
technical requirements.48
Another limitation of the author’s exclusive rights is the “first sale” doctrine,
codified in section 109 of the Copyright Act.49 The first sale doctrine is a specific
limitation on the copyright holder’s distribution rights and is rooted in a distinction
between ownership of the copyright and ownership of the tangible object in which the
copyright is embodied.50 Section 109 permits owners of copyrighted works to resell
or otherwise transfer their tangible copies without the permission of the copyright
owner.51 Without the first sale doctrine, such a transfer would likely be a violation of
the copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right.
One limitation of the author’s exclusive rights is specifically applicable to computer software. Section 117 of the Copyright Act permits a software owner to make
backup copies of the software by providing that “it is not an infringement for the owner
of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or
adaptation of that computer program.”52
Despite its limitations, at least one author suggests that copyright “is probably the
most important prong of intellectual property law as far as the protection of software
is concerned.”53 Mathias Strasser points out that copyright offers “numerous benefits
and virtually no drawbacks” to software developers because it protects their primary
interest in prohibiting “verbatim copying” and, unlike patent law, does not require
them to reveal their source code.54 The ability to withhold source code also allows
software developers to use trade secret law to protect proprietary source code. Indeed,
“[t]rade secret law protects any information that is secret, has economic value and is
reasonably shielded from public access.”55 As long as these requirements are satisfied,
trade secret law can be used to protect source code, object code, and the algorithms
upon which the code is based. The combination of copyright and trade secret
protection creates a relatively strong intellectual property protection regime for
software developers. Software developers have added to this baseline of protection by

code that is functionally equivalent with and may even look similar to the original object
code, the decompiled source code invariably looks different from the original source code.
Id.
47. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d at 1526 (noting that reverse engineering “of
the object code in Sega’s video game cartridges was necessary in order to understand the functional
requirements for Genesis compatibility”).
48. See id. at 1514-15.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
50. See Madison, supra note 12, at 303.
51. “[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).
53. Strasser, supra note 2, ¶ 24.
54. Id. ¶ 35.
55. Id. ¶ 39.
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distributing software under restrictive licensing agreements, rather than outright sale
or lease.56 This strategy is discussed below.57
B. Patent Protection for Computer Software
Like copyright protection, patent law did not protect software until relatively
recently.58 While copyright law protects original expression, patent law provides
protection for new and useful inventions.59 Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent . . . .”60 In the context of software programs, the crucial issue is whether the
mathematical algorithms underlying the source code can be considered a “process” or
whether they are merely non-patentable mathematical formulae.61 Despite the U.S.
Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of this statutory language as protecting “anything
under the sun that is made by man,”62 the Court twice held that these algorithms were
not patentable; first in 1972 and then again in 1978.63
However, in 1981 the Court reversed direction and allowed a patent for a software
application that facilitated a rubber manufacturing process. On facts similar to the
cases in the 1970s, the Court held in Diamond v. Diehr64 that a manufacturing process

56. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 20, 22
(2005). Lerner and Tirole explain:
When for-profit companies manufacture proprietary software products, these copyrighted
works are typically licensed rather than sold. By licensing the software, software
manufacturers can limit their liability if the product does not work effectively and restrict
the rights that the users would normally have (e.g., the ability to simultaneously run the
software on several computers).
Id.
57. See infra Part IV.
58. “Through the 1970s, software was considered equivalent to mathematical algorithms or laws of
nature, and thus was not patentable.” David S. Evans & Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open
Source: The Battle Over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 8 (2004).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
60. Id.
61. Strasser, supra note 2, ¶ 16. See also Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against
Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Other Computer-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025,
1028 n.4 (1990) (“The legal issue before the Court in Benson, and in most of the subsequent cases on the
patentability of computer program-related inventions, was whether the claimed invention [an algorithm]
was a ‘process’ that was patentable under the patent statute.”).
62. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R.
Rep. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)).
63. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding that an algorithm that converted binarycoded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers was not a patentable process within the meaning of
section 101 of the Patent Act); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding that an algorithm used to
update alarm limits during catalytic conversion processes was not a patentable process within the meaning
of section 101 of the Patent Act). These cases are collected and discussed in, inter alia, Strasser, supra note
2, ¶¶ 16-17.
64. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). The Court noted:
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in
a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which
the patent laws were designed to protect . . . then the claim satisfies the requirements of §
101. . . . [W]e do not view respondents’ claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical
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did not forfeit patent protection merely because it utilized software and mathematical
algorithms. In the 1990s the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)
gradually—and controversially—extended the holding of Diamond and the scope of
patent protection for computer software.65 In State St. Bank v. Signature Financial
Group, the CAFC declared that an algorithm was indeed patentable subject matter
because it produced a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”66 The application of
patent law to computer software—and the State Street Bank holding in particular—has
proven to be a highly contentious topic. Patent is generally considered the most
powerful intellectual property regime available.67 A patent owner receives the exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the patented product or process for a term of twenty
years.68 This is a comprehensive grant of monopoly authority and, unlike copyright
law, there is no exception for independent creators of the same or similar inventions.
Yet, some commentators argue that software patents do not present the kind of threat
that many critics have suggested. One author points out that “the only aspects of
computer programs that may be eligible for patent protection are the algorithms on
which they are based . . . . Source code and object code, by contrast, merely implement
these processes and are therefore not independently patentable.”69 Although patent
protection is generally considered the most powerful of the intellectual property
regimes, patents do present software developers with a number of dilemmas. First, the
quid pro quo of patent protection is a strict disclosure requirement that “run[s] counter
to the interests of patentees generally and, in particular, to those of software
developers, as they require revelation of any trade secrets that their code may contain.”70 Recall that trade secret protection is often used in conjunction with copyright
law and licensing agreements to protect software developers’ interests. Those that
favor software patents also suggest that the limited time period of patent protection
—twenty years from the date of filing the patent application—may present problems
for software developers and that the costs of obtaining and enforcing patents can be
prohibitively expensive.71

formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber products
....
Id. at 192-93.
65. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust, Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that a software program used in data processing was patentable); In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583,
1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (vacating the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences rejection of a patent for a
computer program after the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks agrees that “computer programs
embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101 . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).
66. State St. Bank & Trust, Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
67. “A valid patent provides the strongest possible protection for computer software.” Carey R. Ramos
& David S. Berlin, Three Ways to Protect Computer Software, COMPUTER LAWYER, Jan. 1999, at 16, 21.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
69. Strasser, supra note 2, ¶ 15.
70. Id. ¶ 22.
71. Id. It is not entirely convincing that the twenty-year limitation for patent protection is a problem
for software developers. The life span for software is much shorter than twenty years. If anything, the
length of patent protection should be shorter for software than it is for other patented inventions.
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Nevertheless, critics of software patents argue that they actually impede the
progress of software innovation, contrary to the constitutional basis for our patent
system.72 Even proponents of software patents have been willing to acknowledge that
“as far as patent law is concerned, there are certain concerns that the way in which the
PTO [Patent and Trademark Office] and the CAFC [Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit] currently apply it to software may hamper, rather than promote progress and
innovation in the software industry.”73 Many open source proponents have been vocal
critics of the extension of patent protection to computer software.74 These critics
suggest that software patenting is inherently antithetical to the open source philosophy
of free and open access to software source code because patent protection precludes
others from using the source code without express permission from the patent owner.75
Open source proponents also argue that patent protection for software is unnecessary
and may even inhibit innovation in software technology.76 Indeed, software innovation
was occurring at a rapid pace long before patent protection was extended to software.77
Nevertheless, proponents of software patents insist that the software industry has
fundamentally changed and contend that patent protection is now a necessary
intellectual property right to spur innovative software development.78
The dispute over software patent protection reflects a fundamental question
embedded within the open source debate. To what extent are the incentives provided
by intellectual property protection necessary to promote progress and innovation in the
field of computer software development? And, does the open source movement
require a recalibration of the scales in striking a balance between protecting the author/
inventor and ensuring public access? Open source advocates suggest that the relative
success of the open source approach reveals that exclusive intellectual property protection of software as an incentive to promote progress and innovation is unnecessary.79
They argue that under an open source approach, the benefits of collaboration more than
make up for any lost economic incentives.80 Indeed, this faith in the open source
approach is pervasive in the academic literature.
Nevertheless, at least one author is not so enamored with the open source
approach. Mathias Strasser argues that “[t]he fundamental problem associated with all
of the various policy arguments [supporting the open source approach] is that the

72. See Evans & Layne-Farrar, supra note 58, ¶ 54 (discussing and responding to the argument that
patent thickets will discourage innovation).
73. Strasser, supra note 2, ¶ 45.
74. See Evans & Layne-Farrar, supra note 58, ¶ 1.
75. Critics of copyright protection for software made these same claims, id., but copyright law is now
an integral part of the open source approach. One wonders whether the open source movement can use
patent law in ways that promote open source development, similar to the use of copyright law. Could open
source developers build an arsenal of patents and make them freely available? Probably not. Unlike
copyright, patent does not vest in the inventor as soon as the invention is complete. There is a lengthy and
expensive patent prosecution process that is required before a patent is given. The costs and the lengthy
process serve as a barrier to open source participation.
76. Id. ¶¶ 44, 54.
77. Id. ¶ 45.
78. See id. ¶¶ 47-51.
79. See, e.g., infra note 176.
80. See, e.g., infra note 176.
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cooperative spirit fueling the development of the open source software is not a viable
substitute for the market.”81 He suggests that a purely open source software development model would fail to provide the kinds of economic incentives necessary to
promote sustainable progress and innovation of software technology.82 Strasser does
recognize that the open source development model offers some benefits over the
proprietary model, but believes that absent the economic incentives of a proprietary
system, progress would be inhibited. He insists that “[s]ince open source software does
not seem to provide developers with sufficiently powerful incentives to write enough
code of the type that consumers want, it would be undesirable to mandate that all
software be legally open.”83
Strasser’s observations are consistent with the economic incentive based
theoretical underpinnings of our intellectual property regime. These assumptions,
however, are challenged by open source proponents such as Eben Moglen, Professor
of Law at Columbia University and general counsel for the Free Software Foundation
(FSF).84 “Moglen objects to the conventional economic premise that people are motivated only by incentives without which they will not engage in productive activity like
writing software code.”85 Rather, he believes that software innovation is an emergent
property of connected human beings.86 Although Moglen is probably correct to some
extent that there are programmers who have sufficient incentive to write code without
economic reward, it is unclear how generalizable and sustainable this is. Economic
incentive has always been and will continue to be an important tool to foster and
reward desirable activities.
IV. SOFTWARE LICENSING
Although software is protected by copyright, trade secret, and patent law, software
developers are justifiably skeptical of the intellectual property regime’s ability to
adequately protect their interests. Given the digital nature of software, it is particularly
vulnerable to widespread copying. Software can be copied many times over without
any functional degradation of the program. Additionally, interconnectivity of software
users through the Internet facilitates rampant copying of software programs across
space and time. Historically, software distributors have relied on contract law—in the
form of licensing agreements—to extend the protection offered by intellectual property.87

81. Strasser, supra note 2, ¶ 78.
82. Id. (“The prospect of not being able to make money off of software would undermine the monetary
incentives which, in a market economy, serve the important function of inducing software producers to
manufacture software in the first place.”).
83. Id. ¶ 86. With regard to this last assertion, I would tend to agree with Strasser that mandating all
software be open source is not a good idea. No doubt, many within the open source community would
support this approach, but such an all-or-nothing view strikes me as overly principled and not very
pragmatic. It is possible to promote and foster the open source movement without mandating such a
paradigm shift. For a discussion of several ways in which governments can support open source, see
generally Potter, supra note 6.
84. See, e.g., infra note 176.
85. David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 266.
86. See infra note 176.
87. See Ravicher, supra note 4, ¶ 34.
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The standard model for software development and distribution has evolved over
the brief history of the enterprise. In the early days, software programmers were not
writing code for mass-market software programs. There was no mass market for
software during the 1970s because personal computing had not yet emerged.88 Software programmers usually contracted with specific clients to write code for a particular
purpose.89 At that time it was still unclear whether software programmers could utilize
copyright or patent protection for their work; programmers, instead, relied on trade
secret and contract law.90 Even after it became clear that software was protected by
copyright, software developers retained the licensing approach. In Softman Products
Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., Judge Pregerson explained the evolution of the licensing
approach this way:
Historically, the purpose of "licensing" computer program copy use was to employ
contract terms to augment trade secret protection in order to protect against unauthorized copying at a time when, first, the existence of a copyright in computer programs
was doubtful, and, later, when the extent to which copyright provided protection was
uncertain. 91

As personal computing emerged, the growing demand for mass-market software applications required a new licensing model.92 No longer could software programmers rely
on negotiating specific license terms with individual clients. Thus, the mass-market
software license was born.
As mentioned above, software licenses help developers and distributors bolster the
baseline protection afforded by intellectual property law. From the perspective of the
software licensor, licensing transactions are preferable to sales, leases or other modes
of transfer for a number of reasons. First, a license allows the distributor to maintain
his or her intellectual property rights in the program and grant only those rights
specified in the license.93 For example, a licensor could permit a licensee to make
copies of a program, but restrict any rights to distribute those copies. Thus, a license
allows the licensor to impose restrictions and collect royalties based on usage.94
Second, licenses provide software developers with the flexibility of granting an exclusive license to a single licensor or nonexclusive licenses to several or many licensors.95
Licensing also provides a potential end-run around statutory limitations to the
copyright holder’s exclusive rights discussed above.96

88. Most of the software written at this time was for large mainframe computers. See Robert W.
Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 338-39 (1996).
89. Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1487, 1494 (1997).
90. Id.
91. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
92. Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 88, at 339.
93. Peter Quittmeyer, Software Licensing, 2003 PRACTISING L. INST. 903, 909, available at WL 763
PLI/PAT 903 (“In general, a license does not grant or create a property interest at all, but merely a
permission to act or, conversely, a covenant not to sue for such action.”).
94. Id. Presumably, the more rights that are transferred, the higher the royalty rate.
95. Heffan, supra note 89, at 1496.
96. See William H. Neukom & Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Licensing Rights to Computer Software,
1993 PRACTISING L. INST. 775, 777-78, available at WL 354 PLI/PAT 775 (suggesting that software

172

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1

Of particular concern to software distributors is the ‘first sale’ doctrine.97 Under
this doctrine—codified as section 109(a) of the Copyright Act—once a copy of a
copyrighted work has been sold, the copyright owner loses authority to control the
subsequent transfer of that particular tangible copy.98 Because software can be easily
copied with no degradation to the program, the ‘first sale’ doctrine could potentially
justify and facilitate widespread infringement. Initially, courts were reluctant to
interpret license agreements as anything other than a sale.99 More recently, however,
some courts have held that a software license is not a sale and therefore the first sale
doctrine is inapposite.100
Software licensors have also maintained that the licensing of software is not a ‘sale
of goods’ and therefore should not be governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).101 Beyond concerns about the first sale doctrine, software developers are keenly interested in avoiding any implied warranties and liabilities provided
by the UCC.102 Contrary to the desires of software developers and distributors,
however, courts have generally held that software license transactions are covered by
Article 2—either directly or by analogy—and thus are subject to implied warranties
and liabilities.103 Nevertheless, courts have not offered entirely consistent guidance in
this area.104
A. Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Licenses
The legitimacy of the mass-market software licensing approach, in general, and
the validity of some license terms, specifically, has not gone unchallenged. Software
developers utilize standard form mass-market license agreements to give them the same
kind of protection and control that contract law affords them. But a license agreement

publishers license software to, inter alia, negate the first sale doctrine under the Copyright Act).
97. Id.
98. “[T]he owner of a particular copy . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy. . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
99. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
100. See, e.g., Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(holding that the distribution agreement was a license and not a sale, therefore, the ‘first sale’ doctrine was
inapplicable); but see Softman Products Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (software transaction interpreted as a sale instead of a license because “the purchaser commonly
obtains a single copy of the software, with documentation, for a single price . . . [and] [t]he license runs for
an indefinite period.”). These cases are collected and discussed in, inter alia, Quittmeyer, supra note 93,
at 911.
101. This contention is comprised of two arguments. First, a license is not a ‘sale.’ Second, software
is not a ‘good.’
102. See Neukom & Gomulkiewicz, supra note 96, at 777-78 (“Most software publishers offer a limited
warranty and then disclaim other warranties in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code.”). See UCC implied warranties at U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to 2-316 (2004).
103. “Regardless of the software’s specific form or use, it seems clear that computer software, generally,
is considered by the courts to be a tangible, and movable item, not merely an intangible idea or thought and
therefore qualifies as a ‘good’ under Article 2 of the UCC.” Commc’ns Groups, Inc. v. Warner Commc’ns,
Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (citations omitted). See also I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout
Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Article 2 technically does not, and certainly
will not in the future, govern software licenses, but for the time being, the Court will assume it does.”).
104. See supra note 103.
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is not necessarily a contract.105 In the context of software licenses, unlike a traditional
contract, there really is no bargained-for exchange.106 Software distributors rely on a
“notice-plus-conduct model”107 of contract formation. The software provider
essentially makes an offer on the terms stated in the license agreement (notice) and the
licensee assents to those terms by using the software (conduct). Notice of the terms of
the offer, prior to assent, is crucial to this theory of contract formation.108 This noticeplus-conduct model generally takes two forms.
Software developers first relied on so-called “shrinkwrap” licenses to impose
contractual obligations upon licensees.109 A shrinkwrap license is so named because
the software is packaged so that the terms of the agreement are visible through the
shrinkwrap covering on the box, or the package indicates that use of the software is
conditioned on terms contained inside the package.110 A purchaser that wishes not to
enter into a contract on the terms stated in the license may return the software.111
Breaking open the shrinkwrap package and using the software or even failing to return
it within a specified period indicates assent to the terms of the agreement and formation
of a contract.112 That, at least, is the hope of the software licensor.
More recently, software developers have engaged in online distribution of
software via so-called “clickwrap” agreements. In a typical clickwrap transaction, the
purchaser is presented with a standard form license agreement that requires the
consumer to click an “I Agree” button before the software can be used or downloaded.113 Courts have been split as to the contractual enforceability of these types of

105. See LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 53 (2005) (“Open source licenses, it turns out, can be both bare licenses and contracts.”).
106. See, e.g., Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 99, 100 (1999) (noting that one problem with most mass market software licenses is “the public
is powerless to negotiate” the terms).
107. I borrow the phrase “notice-plus-conduct” from David McGowan. See McGowan, supra note 85,
at 289. UCITA could resolve this uncertainty by declaring rules for determining when a license has the
force of contract and when it does not.
108. “Simply stated, a user is not bound by a contract of which he is not made aware.” Nadan, supra
note 7, at 364.
109. See Heffan, supra note 89, at 1498 (“As the commercial software market expanded and the
negotiation of individual software licenses became less practical, developers began using ‘shrinkwrap’
license agreements in an attempt to delineate the rights afforded their retail customers.”).
110. Id. See also, Terry J. Ilardi, Mass Licensing--Part 1: Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps and Browsewraps,
2005 PRACTISING L. INST. 251, 256, available at WL 831 PLI/PAT 251 (“[M]any software vendors merely
indicate on the outside of the packaging that the software is licensed according to a license contained within
the package.”).
111. Neukom & Gomulkiewicz, supra note 96, at 777.
112. Heffan, supra note 89, at 1498.
113. See, e.g., I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp. 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass.
2002). Judge Young begins his opinion with this question:
Has this happened to you? You plunk down a pretty penny for the latest and greatest
software, speed back to your computer, tear open the box, shove the CD-ROM into the
computer, click on "install" and, after scrolling past a license agreement which would take
at least fifteen minutes to read, find yourself staring at the following dialog box: "I agree."
Do you click on the box? You probably do not agree in your heart of hearts, but you click
anyway, not about to let some pesky legalese delay the moment for which you’ve been
waiting.
Id.
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agreements, as well as the proper mode of analysis. Most courts have analyzed these
agreements according to the provisions of the UCC, while a minority of courts has
found that the UCC is inapplicable to these types of licensing transactions.114
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,115 the Seventh Circuit held that a shrinkwrap license
was indeed a contract and was therefore governed by the UCC. ProCD, the plaintiff,
had compiled a database that included information from over 3000 telephone directories.116 Zeidenberg purchased the database software, in CD-ROM form, from a retail
store and made the information available on the Internet for a fee.117 Zeidenberg’s
publication of the database information on the Internet was in direct violation of the
license terms.118 The box containing the CD-ROM indicated that the use of the
software was restricted by the terms of the enclosed license.119 The license terms were
included on a printed manual inside the box and were displayed on the computer screen
every time the software application was run.120 Writing for the majority, Judge
Easterbrook held that “[s]hrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are
objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”121
One year later, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,122 the Seventh Circuit applied and
extended the ProCD holding. Hill arranged for the purchase of a Gateway
computer—with software pre-installed—by providing a credit card number over the
telephone.123 When the computer arrived, the box did not provide notice of additional
licensing terms contained inside, unlike the package in ProCD.124 Despite the lack of
external notice, the court held that the Hills did have notice of the terms of the
agreement and were, therefore, bound by the arbitration clause they sought to avoid.125

114. Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements
Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5th 309 §2(a)(2003).
115. 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e treat the licenses as ordinary contracts accompanying
the sale of products, and therefore as governed by the common law of contracts and the Uniform
Commercial Code.”). Interestingly, the court went on to remark that “[w]hether there are legal differences
between ‘contracts’ and ‘licenses’ (which may matter under the copyright doctrine of first sale) is a subject
for another day.” Id.
116. Id. at 1449.
117. Id. at 1450.
118. See id. Some readers might question whether Zeidenberg’s unauthorized copying of the
information also constitutes copyright infringement. It does not. In the seminal case of Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme Court held that the compilation of names and telephone
numbers in a phone book is not an original work of authorship within the meaning of section 102 of the
Copyright Act. 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991). ProCD illustrates the added protection that a licensing
agreement provides when copyright protection is insufficient to protect a particular work.
119. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1450.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1449.
122. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
123. Id. at 1148.
124. Id. at 1150. Apparently this argument was raised for the first time at oral argument. See id. Judge
Easterbrook explained that this distinction was merely functional and had no legal significance. Id.
125. Id. at 1151. “[T]he Hills knew before they ordered the computer that the carton would include some
important terms, and they did not seek to discover these in advance.” Id. at 1150. Let it not be assumed
that enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses is confined to the Seventh Circuit and Judge Easterbrook. In a
more recent case, the Washington Supreme Court upheld a shrinkwrap license—located on the outside of
the box—and enforced the disclaimer of liability for consequential damages. See M.A. Mortenson Co. v.
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In writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook relied at least in part on the impracticalities
of requiring full disclosure of terms prior to contract formation.126 This rationale
becomes important in thinking about whether it is appropriate to extend this holding
to on-line transactions where disclosure of terms prior to formation is much more
practical.
Courts have generally been more amenable to enforcing clickwrap licenses than
shrinkwrap licenses because affirmative assent is usually given—by clicking an “I
Agree” dialogue box—after notice of the terms are displayed on the computer screen
and before the software can be downloaded or used.127 As shrinkwrap and clickwrap
licensing agreements have become a customary and accepted practice in the software
industry, courts have shown an increasing willingness to enforce them, provided they
meet the minimal requirements necessary for contract formation.128 Enforcement is
more likely where the licensor provides prominent notice of the terms and the licensee
manifests affirmative assent to those terms.129 However, different courts have
employed different modes of analysis and reached inconsistent conclusions.130
V. THE RISE AND FALL OF UCITA
In the early 1990s an American Bar Association (ABA) Study Committee
responded to the uncertainties regarding software licensing transactions and the emerging case law by recommending the development of a uniform law to govern computer
software transactions.131 The NCCUSL and the American Law Institute (ALI) both
agreed at the time that a uniform code would help bring certainty and consistency to
the rules applicable to software transactions.132 As a commercial code, UCITA is

Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 307-08 (Wash. 2000). Relying on the UCC, the court found that
the parties’ previous course of dealing, as well as trade usage, supported enforcement of the license and the
liability disclaimer. Id. at 314.
126. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d at 1149. Judge Easterbrook explained:
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transportation, insurance,
and many other endeavors. Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the
full legal terms with their products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to
customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales
operations such as Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of terms before taking the
buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many
potential buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time. And oral
recitation would not avoid customers’ assertions (whether true or feigned) that the clerk did
not read term X to them, or that they did not remember or understand it.
Id.
127. See, e.g., I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002)
(“If ProCD was correct to enforce a shrinkwrap license agreement, where any assent is implicit, then it must
also be correct to enforce a clickwrap license agreement, where the assent is explicit.”).
128. See Ilardi, supra note 110, at 273 (“While questions remain as to the enforceability of properly
drafted shrinkwrap, clickwrap or even browserwrap agreements, the majority of jurisdictions have,
particularly in the last few years, held that most such agreements are enforceable.”) (emphasis added).
129. See id.
130. See Grierson, supra note 114.
131. Irene Kosturakis, Software Licensing and UCITA, 2003 PRACTISING L. INST. 437, 444 available
at WL 762 PLI/PAT 437.
132. Id. at 445.
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rooted on the premise that clarity, uniformity, stability and freedom to contract are
virtues in a legal system that seeks to foster commercial development.133 After some
initial disagreement about whether this new law would be incorporated into the existing
Article 2 of the UCC, the NCCUSL Executive Committee concluded that a separate
Article 2B was the best approach, given the inherent distinctions between the sale of
goods and the licensing of information rights.134 At the time, some believed that with
respect to commercial contract law, there was sufficient overlap between goods transactions and information transactions to justify inclusion in Article 2.135 One author
suggests that the decision to promulgate a new Article 2B was not dictated so much by
a recognition of profound and inherent distinctions between sales of goods and
licensing of computer information, but rather was influenced by pressure from the
software industry seeking fundamentally different treatment than Article 2 provided.136
In keeping with the requirements for all uniform codes, a draft version of Article
2B was jointly developed by the NCCUSL and the ALI. ALI support for the project
soon diminished, however, and in 1999 the two bodies discontinued their joint drafting
efforts.137 A press release announced that the ALI had “significant reservations about
. . . some of [Article 2B’s] key substantive provisions and its overall clarity and
coherence.”138 Without the approval of the ALI, the proposed code was no longer
eligible for enactment as part of the UCC.139 Nonetheless, the NCCUSL continued its
efforts independently and completed the project as a separate uniform law, resulting
in the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).140 UCITA was
officially promulgated as a model statute for independent consideration by the states
on July 29, 1999.141 The conflict between the ALI and the NCCUSL was only a sign
of things to come; UCITA has been controversial from the very beginning.
Opposition to UCITA has been significant, both in terms of the broad spectrum
of interests aligned against the proposed statute, as well as the passion coming from
certain constituencies. Critics of UCITA have included state officials, federal
agencies, consumer advocacy groups, library organizations, legal academics, large
software purchasers (particularly in the insurance industry), and even software
developers. In 1999, the NCCUSL received letters signed by twenty-four state
Attorneys General opposing UCITA.142 Likewise, a lack of support from the American

133. Id. at 446.
134. Id. at 445. Note that Article 2A of the UCC governs the leasing of goods.
135. Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 2001 PRACTISING
L. INST. 121, 131-32, available at WL 673 PLI/PAT 121.
136. See id. at 132-33.
137. Daniel A. DeMarco & Christopher B. Wick, Now UCITA, Now You Don’t: A Bankruptcy
Practitioner’s Observations on the Proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., May 2004.
138. Article 2B is Withdrawn from U.C.C. and Will Be Promulgated by NCCUSL as Separate Act, THE
ALI REPORTER, Spring 1999, available at http://www.ali.org.
139. See Boss, supra note 135, at 135.
140. DeMarco & Wick, supra note 137.
141. Id.
142. The letter stated:
We believe the current draft puts forward legal rules that thwart the common sense
expectations of buyers and sellers in the real world. We are concerned that the policy
choices embodied in these new rules seem to almost invariably favor a relatively small

2006]

RETHINKING UCITA

177

Bar Association (ABA) was suspected and revealed when the NCCUSL failed to
submit a resolution to the House of Delegates of the ABA to ratify UCITA in 2000.143
Even the Federal Trade Commission expressed concern about the lack of consumer
protection in UCITA and discussed possible remedies.144
In general terms, UCITA was viewed by critics as unduly deferential to the
interests of software developers/licensors over licensees.145 Much like the UCC,
UCITA embraces and is built on the concept of freedom of contract.146 UCITA is
really a set of default rules that will apply only if the parties do not otherwise agree to
different terms. Practically speaking, this means that parties with greater bargaining
leverage benefit from both the UCC and UCITA because the terms of the agreement
control.147 Critics have argued first, that the freedom to contract model as adopted in
UCITA is inappropriate for software licensing transactions,148 and second, that several
of UCITA’s default provisions are too favorable to software developers.
The view that statutory deference to freedom of contract leads to unfair or unjust
agreements is not new. Indeed, the debate over regulation of business transactions
versus freedom of contract occurred over fifty years ago during the UCC drafting and
redrafting process.149 One author recalls that “[e]arly drafts of the UCC were decidedly
more regulatory and included measurably more judicial oversight of commercial
activities.”150 In response to criticism from commercial and business entities, the
drafters modified the UCC by embracing the freedom of contract model and adopting
a decidedly more laissez-faire approach.151 This strategy ultimately ensured support
of the business and commercial interests that would make or break state adoption.152
Ironically, the similar approach taken in UCITA (embracing the freedom of contract)
has been one of the primary roadblocks to more widespread acceptance. The same
business and commercial interests that favored contract freedom in the context of the
sale of goods are not so enthusiastic in the context of software licensing. As software
licensees, these entities—with the exception of the most large and powerful companies
—do not have the kind of bargaining leverage that will enable them to negotiate
favorable terms with software licensors. With regard to UCITA, it is essentially only
the software developers that have an interest in contract freedom: the rest of the

number of vendors to the detriment of millions of businesses and consumers who purchase
computer software and subscribe to internet services.
Letter from W.A. Drew Edmonson et al., State Attorneys General, to Gene Lebrun, NCCUSL (July 23,
1999), available at http://www.jamesshuggins.com/h/tek1/ucita_ags_19990723_letter.htm. Thirteen
attorneys general signed this letter and eleven signed a subsequent letter in agreement. Id.
143. Boss, supra note 135, at 134 n.15.
144. Id. at 135 n.17.
145. DeMarco & Wick, supra note 137.
146. See Nim Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643, 647 (2003).
147. Id. at 647-48 (“If the law supports standard contracts based loosely on a freedom of contract
principle, then the terms of that contract will tend to favor the drafter over the other side . . . .”).
148. Id. at 651.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 657.
151. Id.
152. For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of the history of the drafting, redrafting, and
adoption of the UCC, see Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code
1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359 (2001).
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world—including consumers, commercial and business entities, and others—would
prefer more of a regulatory approach. Commercial and business entities are the key
players here. Without their support, adoption of UCITA will remain an uphill
struggle.153
Some opponents have also offered the view that, at present, commercial practices
and customs in the context of software licensing are not sufficiently well-developed or
widely-accepted to justify codification into uniform law.154 The software licensing
regime is, indeed, a relatively nascent one. Perhaps it is too early to encode a uniform
set of rules on this emerging commercial practice. Or perhaps, a state-by-state
approach will offer valuable experimentation in this area of the law until a more robust
set of customs and rules are established.155 One might even argue that the open source
movement represents compelling evidence of the shifting sands of commercial software
development and distribution practices; evidence that could be used to support a waitand-see approach. This view, however, fails to consider that the open source movement actually embraces—perhaps grudgingly—the copyright-then-license regime used
by the commercial proprietary software developers. This concession by open source
developers could be seen as a final affirmation of the copyright-then-license paradigm.
Moreover, there is little value in experimenting with an ad-hoc state-by-state approach
in this area given the ubiquity of software licensing in commercial transactions.
In addition to the general view that licensing of software information has not yet
fully developed consistent, broadly accepted commercial practices, opponents of
UCITA have challenged several specific provisions of the code as overly protective
of the interests of major software developers. UCITA’s validation of shrinkwrap and
clickwrap license agreements was particularly troublesome to many critics. One author
recalls that “the continuing refrain heard from opponents is that UCITA validates
fictional assent and thus there is no contract in a classical sense.”156 This fictional
assent usually comes in the form of a click on an “I agree” dialogue box. It is questionable whether most computer users read the terms of the licensing agreement or
even realize that they are entering a binding agreement at all. Additionally, UCITA’s
validation of “pay now, terms later” licensing agreements does not seem consistent
with the realities of online transactions. In the early cases involving over-the-phone
software purchases and shrinkwrap licenses,157 the courts were willing to stretch
traditional contract theory to enforce terms of an agreement that were not disclosed
until after payment occurred. This was justified in part on the realities of over-thephone transactions where disclosure of all the terms is not practical.158 But online
transactions are quite different in this respect. By its very nature, the Internet makes

153. Professor Razook points out that “the U.C.C., as proposed to the states, enjoyed the support of one
key constituency already alienated by the [NCCUSL’s] proposed UCITA: business and commercial
interests.” Razook, supra note 146, at 656.
154. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
155. Razook, supra note 146, at 659 (“The appeal of a state-by-state evolution of rules for software
transactions is based on Justice Brandeis’ often-used description of states as laboratories for the creation,
testing, and acceptance or rejection of applicable laws.”).
156. Boss, supra note 135, at 147-48.
157. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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it possible to disclose all terms prior to formation of the contract. This ease of information exchange undermines the rolling contract rationale used by some courts to
justify and enforce shrinkwrap license agreements. Although a new contract model
might become necessary in the digital/internet age, the transition is disconcerting to
many.
UCITA’s treatment of warranties and liabilities, licensor self-help, and licensee
reverse engineering has also been particularly controversial.159 As drafted, UCITA
permits software licensors to disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or
fitness and shift the risk of liability for damages to the licensee.160 Although this is
consistent with the UCC approach in the sale of goods context, some have criticized
this model as overly “goodcentric.”161 With respect to a sale of goods, the purchaser
conceivably has an opportunity to inspect the product before accepting the deal,
whereas licensees of digital information do not have this opportunity.162 Inspection of
the product takes place only after the license agreement is binding.163 This distinction
makes warranty and liability disclaimers particularly risky for the licensee. At least
one author has suggested an alternative warranty disclaimer regime where the licensor
and the licensee share this risk.164
Probably the most troubling aspect of UCITA, however, was its treatment of
licensor self-help and licensee reverse engineering. As initially drafted, UCITA
permitted a software licensor to electronically disable a licensee’s ability to use the
software in the case of a breach of the license agreement, provided certain notice
requirements were satisfied.165 In essence, this provision gave the software licensor the
authority to impose his or her own preliminary injunction against a licensee without
any judicial process. The burden would then shift to licensees to show that they had
not in fact breached their license. This provision is a primary example of why many
UCITA opponents viewed the proposed statute as a coup for software developers.
Likewise, UCITA’s proscription against reverse engineering of software source code
by licensees encountered similar resistance. UCITA permitted this restriction because
of its deference to, and enforcement of, the terms of the licensing agreement. UCITA
would have validated a provision in a licensing agreement that prohibited reverse
engineering. As explained above, reverse engineering is a valuable and widely-used
process in the software development industry and some courts have held that it can be
considered a fair use under the Copyright Act.166 Vehement opposition to these two

159. See infra text accompanying notes 280-81 (Richard Stallman expressing concerns with liability
limitations and reverse engineering).
160. See § 406 of UCITA, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm.
161. Razook, supra note 146, at 651.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See generally Leo L. Clarke, Performance Risk, Form Contracts and UCITA, 7 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001).
165. Razook, supra note 146, at 648-49.
166. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (“We
conclude that where [reverse engineering] is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional
elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking
such access, [reverse engineering] is a fair use of the copyrighted work . . . .”).
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issues, in particular, has ultimately forced the NCCUSL to amend UCITA to eliminate
the self-help provision and the outright prohibition of reverse engineering.167
Thus far, the broad opposition and intensive lobbying efforts have limited
adoption of UCITA to only two states (Virginia and Maryland).168 In fact, twice as
many states (Vermont, Iowa, North Carolina, and West Virginia) have passed antiUCITA “bomb shelter” legislation that would preclude application of UCITA by
choice-of-law licensing terms.169 In Maine, UCITA was introduced for consideration
as LD 1324 in 2001, but never escaped the House floor.170 Despite the recent amendments adopted by the NCCUSL, Maine has not seriously reconsidered adopting
UCITA. At present, it appears that UCITA has completely lost any traction and some
have speculated about UCITA’s demise.171 However, such speculation may be
exaggerated.172 The original motivation for developing a uniform code to cover software transactions was a growing recognition that the sale of goods provisions of
Article 2 were not well suited to software licensing and that courts were not entirely
consistent in dealing with these new transactions. In this respect, nothing has changed
since the ALI and the NCCUSL first conceived of a new uniform code in the early
1990s. On the other hand, the landscape of commercial software development and
distribution has been altered significantly since then by the emerging commercial
presence of open source software.
As states, and maybe even the ALI, consider whether or not to give UCITA
another look, it might be important to think about how it would affect the open source
movement. In rethinking UCITA, there would be little need to consider its implication
with regard to open source software if the open source movement is merely a passing
fancy. If, however, the open source approach is here to stay, it becomes an important
consideration when thinking about rules that govern software licensing transactions.

167. As amended, section 118 of UCITA now reads:
Notwithstanding the terms of a contract subject to this [Act], a licensee that lawfully
obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may identify, analyze, and use those
elements of the program necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs, including adapting or modifying the licensee’s
computer program, if:
(1) the elements have not previously been readily available to the licensee;
(2) the identification, analysis, or use is performed solely for the purpose of enabling
such interoperability; and
(3) the identification, analysis, or use is not prohibited by law other than this [Act].
UCITA § 118, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm. Adoption of these
amendments in 2002 has not yet stimulated any renewed interest in the statute.
168. Deanna Allen & Jon Grossman, Is Death Knell for UCITA the Last Word, 229 THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCIER 78 (2003).
169. Carol Ebbinghouse, UCITA Stopped, but Librarians and Consumers Remain Vigilant, Aug. 11,
2003, http://www.infotoday.com/newsbreaks/nb030811-1.shtml. A software licensor that wants the
protection of UCITA might include in their license a provision that states that the agreement is covered by
Maryland or Virginia law. This type of choice-of-law provision is not uncommon. However, in those states
that have passed anti-UCITA bomb shelter legislation, this kind of choice-of-law provision would be
unenforceable. See Boss, supra note 135, at 133.
170. L.D. 1324 (120th Leg. 2001).
171. See, e.g., Allen & Grossman, supra note 168; Ilardi, supra note 110, at 255 (noting that “for all
intents and purposes UCITA has failed”).
172. Razook, supra note 146, at 667.
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The next section examines the development of the open source movement, from a
limited tradition within academic circles to a mainstream commercial success story.
This section is included to provide some background, and more importantly, to offer
a foundation for speculating about where the open source movement is going.
VI. A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPEN SOURCE APPROACH
A. Academic Roots
The history of the open source approach is contemporaneous with the history of
software programming itself. That is to say that the idea of sharing source code is not
a new one. Most accounts of the history of the open source approach begin with an
MIT computer programmer named Richard Stallman.173 According to the founding
myth of the open source movement, Stallman became frustrated by the restrictions that
software licenses placed on the use and modification of computer programs.174
Stallman felt that these restrictions inhibited the effective and efficient development
of new and innovative software technology by sticking a wrench in the collaborative
programming process.175 Dennis Kennedy explains that “Stallman and others believed

173. See, e.g., Lerner & Tirole, supra note 56, at 22; John C. Yates & Paul H. Arne, Open Source
Software Licenses: Perspectives of the End User and the Software Developer, 823 PRACTISING L. INST.
97, 104 (2005); Ieuan G. Mahoney & Edward J. Naughton, Open Source Software Monetized: Out of the
Bazaar and into Big Business, 21 NO. 10 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 1, 1 (Oct. 2004).
174. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 349. One author uncovered a story told by Stallman about the first laser
printers at MIT’s Artificial Intelligence lab that exemplifies Stallman’s frustration:
The laser printers of the mid-1970’s were the size of today’s compact cars. When Xerox
gave the AI lab a Xerox Graphics Printer, the only place for it was in the lab’s ninth-floor
machine room. Researchers connected the printer to the local area network that the lab was
developing, and soon anybody in the building could print a 100-page document by typing
in a few commands.
That worked fine, except that sometimes the printer would run out of paper or jam, and
dozens of other jobs would pile up. Other times there would simply be a lot of people
wanting to print long documents, and the person who needed to print a single page would
have to run up and down the stairs or babysit the printer until that page appeared. But since
the programmers at the lab had the source code to the program that ran the printer, they
could add features that solved these problems. Soon the printer was helping the lab run
smoothly. “It would send you a message when your document had been printed,” recalls
Stallman. “It would send you a message if you had anything queued and there was a paper
jam.”
All this changed in 1978, when Xerox replaced the machine with a new laser printer
called a “Dover” but wouldn’t share the printer’s source code with the lab. “We wanted to
put those features into the Dover program, but we couldn’t,” Stallman says. Xerox wouldn’t
put the features into the program either. “So we had to suffer with paper jams that nobody
knew about.”
Heffan, supra note 89, at 1504 n.101 (citing Simson L. Garfinkel, Programs to the People, TECH. REV.,
Feb.-Mar. 1991, at 53, 54).
175. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 349. The author notes:
The programming culture of the time created an environment where programmers freely
worked on programs with each other, contributed fixes for the general public good, and saw
development in a community context where people were free to take advantage of the
innovations and improvements that others created, while still giving attribution and
acknowledgement for the efforts of individual programmers.
Id.
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that proprietary, commercial development of software would lead to a number of
problems relating to security, loss of innovation, incompatibilities and the like, in part
because it reduced the number of skilled, independent programmers who could analyze
and correct source code.”176
With the assistance of law professor Eben Moglen, Stallman drafted the first
General Public License (GPL) and began the work of developing software to be distributed under the license.177 The GPL is considered by many to be the most restrictive
open source license because of its so-called “copyleft” provision. The copyleft provision ensures that any subsequent distribution of an open source project or derivative
work is distributed under the GPL open source license. This has been pejoratively
described as the “viral aspect” of the GPL. This aspect will be more fully discussed
in subsequent sections.
In 1985, Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation (FSF) to encourage
development of open source software and distribution under the GPL.178 The superstar
of the open source movement, Linux, is an operating system distributed under the GPL.
Linux has recently gained popular attention by nibbling away at Microsoft’s

176. Id. at 349-50. Stallman’s concerns again raise that fundamental question embedded within the open
source debate: Is collaboration more important than economic incentives in spurring innovative development of computer software? There is some inherent logic in the idea that many minds contributing to a
project will be more effective, efficient, and creative than one or a few minds. This is the logic of the open
source community. Beyond this utilitarian rationale, there is also an argument that there is inherent a priori
value in sharing ideas for the good of the community. At a recent keynote symposium at the University of
Maine School of Law, Professor Eben Moglen offered his view that incentives are no longer necessary to
spur creative and innovative software:
The Net is a superconductive medium for the creation of software. So, as I wrote in
1999, when it was a little less obvious than it is today, we are witnessing a phenomenon that
was first noticed by Michael Faraday at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Wrap a coil
around a magnet; spin the magnet. Electrical current flows in the wire. One does not ask,
“What is the incentive for the electrons to leave home?” It is an inherent emergent property
of the system, we have a name for it: we call it induction. The question we ask is, “What
is the resistance of the wire?” Moglen’s corollary to Faraday’s Law says wrap the Internet
around every brain on the planet; spin the planet. Software flows in the network. It is wrong
to ask, “What is the incentive for people to create?” It is an emergent property of connected
human minds that they do create.
Eben Moglen, Freeing the Mind: Free Software and the Death of Proprietary Culture, 56 ME. L. REV. 1,
4 (2004). Despite Moglen’s creative effort to analogize human beings with magnets and coils, traditional
economic logic suggests that incentives play an important role as well.
177. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 350. It should be noted that Stallman did not use the term “open
source” software. Instead, Stallman coined the term “free software.” Kennedy explains that “Stallman’s
vision and philosophy was that software should be free (as in speech, not as in beer) . . . .” Id. at 349.
There is continuing disagreement as to the appropriate use of each term.
178. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open Source
Software Revolution and the Implications for Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 183 (1999). See also
Krysten Crawford, Linux Litigation Endangers Future of the Open-Source Software Movement, BROWARD
DAILY BUS. REV., Mar. 17, 2004, at 8. Crawford reports:
According to industry analysts, Linux is poised to become the No. 2 computer operating
system in 2004, after Microsoft Corp.’s Windows . . . . Right now there are an estimated
2.6 million Web and file servers running Linux. Computer research company Gartner Inc.,
estimates that the Linux server market, worth $2.6 billion now, will become a $6.3 billion
business by 2008.
Id.
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monopolistic share of the PC operating system market and already has a substantial
presence in the server market. Linux is leading the commercial mainstreaming trend
of open source software that has occurred in recent years.
Contemporaneous with Stallman’s efforts to establish the Free Software
Foundation and promote the GPL, programmers at the University of California at
Berkeley (Berkeley) were working on improvements to the Unix operating system.179
The Berkeley efforts were similar to Stallman’s free software projects in that
programmers had free and open access to source code and “[p]rogrammers could make
derivative works as they saw appropriate to fix bugs, make improvements and fine tune
the program.”180 As the project became more popular, programmers drafted a license
(the Berkeley Software Distribution License, hereinafter BSD license) that “allowed
licensees to work with source code and make derivative works.”181 Although the BSD
license was similar in many ways to Stallman’s GPL, a crucial difference was that the
BSD license did not require derivative works to be distributed under the same licensing
terms.182 In other words, the BSD license did not contain the now-controversial copyleft provision. The significance of this distinction will be discussed further in subsequent sections of this article. It is sufficient to note here that this difference signifies
an early fault line within the open source community. The BSD license and the GPL
represent the early days of the open source movement. These academic roots were
nourished by both pragmatic and ethical concerns of software programmers.
B. Commercial Mainstreaming
More recently, open source software has stepped out of the computer labs of
college campuses and offices of programming hobbyists, and into the mainstream
commercial arena. The impact of the Internet upon the proliferation of open source
projects cannot be understated. By reducing the transaction costs of collaboration, the
Internet has facilitated widespread contribution from programmers around the globe.183
Mahoney and Naughton discuss this trend toward commercial adoption of open source
software in their article, Open Source Software Monetized: Out of the Bazaar and into
Big Business.184 With apparent despair they acknowledge that:
[O]pen source software is big business. Some of the largest owners of proprietary
computer technology, companies like Sun Microsystems, Hewlett Packard, and even
IBM—the very icon of the industry that Stallman rejected—have embraced open

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Kennedy, supra note 11, at 351.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
One author explains:
Contributors to an open source program are often geographically dispersed . . . . Use of
modern communication technologies—project web pages, mailing lists, newsgroups, et
cetera—are necessary to facilitate the desired peer feedback that is at the heart of the open
source process. In short, the growth of the Internet and Internet technologies has made the
open source method possible.
Marcus Maher, Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative Intellectual Property Incentive
Paradigm, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 619, 626 (2000) (citations omitted).
184. Mahoney & Naughton, supra note 173, at 1.
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source software. These companies have seized open source software as a strategic
weapon, one that now represents a significant and growing source of revenue for their
shareholders.
The open source movement may have been born as a political ideology, a
communitarian alternative to corporate profit seeking and the ‘privatization’ of
technical innovation, but it has been transformed into a commercial enterprise.185

1. Netscape
In 1998, Netscape surprised many by releasing its popular Navigator Internet
browser under an open source license.186 At least one author suggests that Netscape
was influenced at the time by an essay espousing the practical benefits of open source
software development.187 In his essay, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, programmer
Eric Raymond argues that open source software development (the Bazaar) produced
higher quality software more efficiently than proprietary software development (the
Cathedral).188 Decision-makers at Netscape were intrigued with the idea of developing
a higher quality browser software product at lower costs to compete with Microsoft’s
Internet Explorer. One Netscape executive articulated what he perceived to be the
competitive advantage of adopting the open source approach by saying that “[f]or
Netscape, this gives us a way to engage the creative, innovative abilities of literally
orders of magnitude more people than we could ever—really any commercial software
company could ever afford to just put on their payroll.”189 Since Netscape’s bold
adoption of the open source approach in 1998, commercial interest in open source
software has steadily increased, with Linux leading the way.
2. Linux
Undoubtedly, Linux is the poster child of the open source movement and has
garnered much of the commercial investment in the open source approach.190 Linux
is an open source operating system. Operating systems are themselves software
programs, but they are mission critical software programs because they control the
computer hardware.191 Software applications require an operating system as a platform
to communicate between the computer hardware and the specific application.192
In 1991, a young Finnish student named Linus Torvalds shared with the world his
operating system “kernel.” Torvalds was inspired by a seminal book entitled

185. Id.
186. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 353.
187. Id.
188. See generally Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, available at http://www.
firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_3/raymond/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
189. Nathan Newman, The Origins and Future of Open Source Software, available at http://www.
netaction.org/opensrc/future/oss-whole.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) (citations omitted).
190. “Commercial mainstreaming, that is, entrepreneurs and companies seeking to profit by establishing
new (or old) business models on the open-source movement, has primarily focused on Linux.” Vetter,
supra note 3, at 608.
191. Id. at 605.
192. See id. at n.113.
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Operating System written by Andrew S. Tanenbaum.193 Professor Tanenbaum had
written an operating system called Minix and included the 12,000 lines of source code
in his book.194 In keeping with the collaborative roots of academic programmers and
probably influenced by the efforts of Richard Stallman, Torvalds openly shared the
source code of his kernel and eventually decided to license the project using the open
source GPL.195 Programmers across the globe became interested in Torvalds’ kernel
and integrated it with existing programs to create a complete functioning operating
system—GNU/Linux (popularly known as Linux).196 Linux is truly an unprecedented
and amazing story. It is a privately provisioned public good.197 It is a valuable
resource that is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable; and it’s free.198
As one measure of its success, IBM has essentially abandoned its business of
programming its own version of Unix and has invested heavily in Linux.199 In 2001,
IBM pledged to invest $1 billion in Linux and by January of 2002, they claimed to
have recouped nearly the entire investment.200 At the same time that IBM, Hewlett
Packard, Dell and other computer industry mainstays have embraced Linux and the
open source approach, smaller companies, such as Red Hat, Caldera, and Debian have
made Linux the foundation of their business model.201 These companies compile
software applications and distribute various Linux versions. They also charge for
value-added services such as installation, consultation, and support.
Beyond the commercial success of Linux and Linux-based companies in the
United States, the promise of Linux extends to the developing world. At a conference
sponsored by the United Nations, a World Bank representative explained that
“[developing] countries need cheap and efficient technology to make the giant leaps
necessary to catch up with the rest of the world. Many are now using Linux, which
looks to become the No. 1 operating system in China and India soon.”202 A growing
list of governments is considering requirements or incentives that would encourage the
use of open source software by government agencies.203 Linux is just one

193. See Ragib Hasan, History of Linux, Version 2.1, (1999) https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rhasan/linux/.
194. Id.
195. Vetter, supra note 3, at 607.
196. Maher, supra note 183, at 622. “In 1991, about ten people were using and modifying Mr. Torvald’s
original 10,000 lines of code; today, there are an estimated seven million people using Linux and the code
has grown to approximately 1.5 million lines.” Patrick K. Bobko, Linux and General Public Licenses: Can
Copyright Keep “Open Source” Software Free?, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 85 (Winter 2000) (citations omitted).
197. Vetter, supra note 3, at 607.
198. It is interesting to note that the open source approach is what makes Linux a non-excludable
resource. Because it is licensed under the open source GPL license, it cannot be made into a proprietary,
and therefore excludable, program.
199. Vetter, supra note 3, at 615.
200. Stephen Shankland, IBM: Linux Investment Nearly Recouped, CNET NEWS, Jan. 29, 2002,
http://news.com.com/2100-1001-825723.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
201. See Hasan, supra note 193.
202. M i c h e l l e Deli o, De v e l o p i n g W o r l d N e e d s L i n u x , W I R E D N E W S ,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,59334,00.html? (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
203. See, e.g., Todd Benson, Brazil: Free Software’s Biggest and Best Friend, N.Y. TIMES, March 29,
2005, at C1 (“Looking to save millions of dollars in royalties and licensing fees, Mr. da Silva has instructed
government ministries and state-run companies to gradually switch from costly operating systems made by
Microsoft and others to free operating systems, like Linux.”).
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example—albeit the best example—of the promise and potential of open source
software.
3. Apache
Linux, however, is by no means the only successful open source project. The
Apache Web server—an open source project—delivers the majority of Web pages
viewed by Internet users around the world on the World Wide Web.204 Web servers
are fundamental software technology for the Internet. “Products like Apache make the
Web the Web, just as operating systems make a computer a computer.”205 When a user
clicks on a link, the Web server sends information from that server computer to the
user’s computer.206 In a recent survey, the Apache web server was used by more than
67% of Internet websites, compared with Microsoft’s 21% market share.207 In the mid1990s a group of Webmasters—connected by the Internet—formed the Apache
Software Foundation (ASF).208 The ASF utilized freely available source code from an
early Web server that had been developed by the National Center for Supercomputer
Applications (NCSA).209 After modifying and adding to the original source code, the
ASF released a new Web server under a specialized Apache open source license.210
The Apache license is very close to a complete contribution to the public domain. It
merely requires that certain attributions and notices be passed to downstream users as
a condition of use.211 Marcus Maher explains that “[t]he advantages of Apache include
the fact that it is free (as in costless), that it is free (as in open source), and that it
provides high quality performance.”212
4. Microsoft Responds
The tripartite benefits of Apache, Linux, and other open source products have
forced proprietary software developers to think carefully about how to respond to
increasing commercial interest in the open source approach.213 Microsoft’s concern
with the growth of Linux and other open source projects was exhibited as early as
October of 1998.214 An internal Microsoft memorandum from 1998 revealed the
concern that Microsoft had with regard to the growth of Linux and other open source
projects.215

204. Vetter, supra note 3, at 605.
205. Id. at 609 n.132.
206. Id.
207. This survey was conducted by the Netcraft Web Server Survey,
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_server_survey.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
208. Vetter, supra note 3, at 610.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 611.
212. Maher, supra note 183, at 621.
213. Other well-known open source software products include the Perl programming language, Sendmail
(an Internet e-mail router), Jboss application server, MySQL database, and the Mozilla open source Webbrowser. Id. at 623-25.
214. Stephen R. Walli, Perspectives on the Shared Source Initiative, Mar. 24, 2005,
http://www.onlamp.com/pub/a/onlamp/2005/03/24/shared_source.html.
215. The memo states:
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In 2001, Microsoft announced that it would begin sharing source code to some of
its software programs with limited audiences as part of its new Shared Source
Initiative.216 Under the program, Microsoft customers and independent developers are
permitted to download the source code of a limited number of Microsoft programs,
examine it, and copy it for personal use.217 Academic researchers are given additional
permission to make limited modifications to the source code.218 However, software
developers are not permitted to modify the code or distribute copies without a
Microsoft license.219 Open source proponents have responded critically and skeptically
to the Shared Source Initiative; nonetheless, Microsoft’s active response to the open
source movement and its recognition of the benefits of sharing source code are worth
noting. This is further evidence that the open source approach is sustainable and is
here to stay.
C. Making Sense of Open Source Success
The commercial success of Linux, Apache, and other open source projects has
occurred despite the fact that there are substantial legal uncertainties about the validity
of open source licenses in general and specific license provisions in particular. One
can only speculate whether this momentum can continue in the face of these
uncertainties or whether resolution of some of these questions—judicially or
legislatively—will be necessary for open source projects to continue to prosper. A
uniform code governing software transactions, such as UCITA, could help to create
more certainty and legitimacy with regard to open source licenses, thereby promoting
the open source movement. However, some have suggested that UCITA will have a
detrimental impact on open source development. Understanding why the open source
approach has been so successful might inform an analysis of whether UCITA will
benefit or harm the open source movement.
A fair amount of academic scholarship has been dedicated to the task of explaining
the relative success of the open source movement. Specifically, scholars have offered
various theories about why individual programmers choose to volunteer their time to
open source projects, as well as why some open source projects have been embraced
by for-profit commercial enterprises. Marcus Maher uses the science of complexity

Open Source Software (OSS) is a development process which promotes rapid creation and
deployment of incremental features and bug fixes in an existing code/knowledge base. In
recent years, corresponding to the growth of Internet, OSS projects have acquired the depth
& complexity traditionally associated with commercial projects such as Operating Systems
and mission critical servers.
Consequently, OSS poses a direct, short-term revenue and platform threat to Microsoft
—particularly in server space. Additionally, the intrinsic parallelism and free idea exchange
in OSS has benefits that are not replicable with our current licensing model and therefore
present a long term developer mindshare threat.
Vinod Valloppillil, Microsoft Memo: Open Source Software: A (New?) Development Methodology, Aug.
11, 1998, http://www.scripting.com/misc/halloweenMemo.html.
216. See Walli, supra note 214.
217. Microsoft Depends On Shared Source, Dips Toe In Open-Source Waters, TECHWEB NEWS, Apr.
7, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 5493721.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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theory to explain the development and success of the open source movement.220 He
explains that the open source methodology is a complex system and that “complexity
theory can explain the observed result of the technical strength of open source
projects.”221 In laying the foundation for this analysis, Maher suggests that the success
of the open source movement cannot be adequately understood in terms of the
economic incentives system created by federal intellectual property law.222 He first
argues that “[p]roduct comparisons show that open source software attains high
technical standards despite the relative absence of economic motivation for the creators
of this software,”223 and provides several examples of the most successful open source
projects.224 Maher also proposes various theories to explain why individual programmers and firms choose to contribute their time and effort to open source projects,
despite the fact that there is no direct economic reward. He first offers Eric Raymond’s
“gift culture” theory: “[I]n gift cultures, social status is determined not by what you
control but by what you give away.”225 Programmers receive recognition and status
from contributing code to open source projects. Programmers that contribute good
source code to projects gain prestige among project contributors and possibly the
larger open source community.226 Another reason offered for contribution to the open
source approach is the ability to control and modify the code to meet specific needs of
the firm or the programmer.227 This flexibility of open source software offers a
valuable advantage over proprietary software.228 Finally, Maher suggests that “[t]he
pure pleasure of hacking is another reason why individuals contribute to open source
projects.”229 The open source community provides professional programmers with an
alternative arena to write more creative code and participate in projects that would be
unavailable to them during their day job. All of these factors probably play a role in
creating the necessary incentives for programmers to contribute to open source
projects. All this suggests that there are additional reasons for programmers to contribute to open source projects beyond the economic incentives provided by intellectual

220. Maher, supra note 183, at 658.
221. Id.
222. “The open source software movement, which has gained publicity as the popularity of the Linux
operating system has grown, provides an alternative to the economic incentives that dominate the thinking
of U.S. intellectual property policy.” Id. at 619.
223. Id.
224. These include the Apache web server, the Berkeley Internet Name Domain package (BIND), the
Linux operating system, the Mozilla web browser, the Perl programming language, and the Sendmail
internet e-mail router. Id. at 621-24.
225. Id. at 632.
226. Id. Maher suggests:
Prestige within the open source community may allow a programmer to more readily
persuade others to join projects owned by such a person, or to place particular value on that
person’s input. To a lesser extent, the prestige of a developer in the open source community
may also spill over to the exchange economy, placing them in higher demand within that
market.
Id.
227. See id. at 633.
228. For a concrete example of the benefits of flexibility, see supra note 175.
229. Maher, supra note 183, at 635.
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property protections. Maher’s use of complexity theory to analyze the open source
movement is a novel and creative approach.
Complexity theory has been used in various fields (e.g., genetics and economics)
to explain behaviors and outcomes that cannot be adequately understood using traditional theories.230 In this respect, it is well suited for analyzing the surprising growth
of the open source movement and the superior technical merit of many open source
projects. “[C]omplex systems are groups of agents whose nature and behavior are
governed by certain sets of rules. The nature and behavior of these agents lead to
outcomes within the system and capabilities of the system making it greater than the
sum of its parts.”231 Leaving the details of complexity theory for those who would
choose to read Maher’s article, open source methodology is a complex system because
many individual programmers (agents) contribute in semi-structured ways to open
source projects. Maher states that the “main consequences of complexity are adaptability and emergence.”232 The interaction of many contributing programmers and the
flow of information and source code through the open source system give rise to
unpredictable yet impressive outcomes. To a complexity theorist, the technical
sophistication of open source software is not surprising; rather, it is precisely what is
expected from a complex system. Maher analyzes the development of the Linux
operating system in terms of complexity theory as a concrete and specific example of
the development and fruition of a complex open source project.233 Recognizing that
complex systems are highly unpredictable, Maher makes no effort to predict the future
of the open source movement. He does, however, offer some of the potential risks for
the open source movement to avoid. Specifically, he suggests that the open source
community should avoid driving the open source approach away from complexity and
toward chaos in one direction and linearity in the other.234
Of particular relevance for this paper, Maher is concerned about the validity of
some open source licenses. He recommends the adoption of a uniform code—UCITA
—to ensure that open source license provisions such as copyleft and disclaimer of
implied warranties are enforced.235 According to Maher, “the UCITA, if adopted by
the states, could help resolve some of the uncertainty regarding open source
licenses.”236 Some of these legal uncertainties will be discussed below.
D. Open Source Licenses
Although the open source movement might still be described as being in its infant
stages, there is substantial academic scholarship addressing various aspects of the
topic. A survey of the relevant legal scholarship reveals that open source licensing has
been the prominent focus of many, if not most, contributions.237 This makes sense

230. Id. at 646.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 655.
233. See id. at 664.
234. Id. at 669.
235. Id. at 677-78.
236. Id. at 678.
237. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 11; Gomulkiewicz, supra note 178; Natasha T. Horne, Comment,
Open Source Software Licensing: Using Copyright Law to Encourage Free Use, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
863 (2001); Nadan, supra note 7.
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given that licensing is the primary mode of distribution for software—open source and
proprietary alike—as opposed to outright sale or lease.238
A myriad of open source licenses have been promulgated and used for distributing
open source software.239 Much of the academic scholarship has attempted to catalog
and classify the most prominent open source licenses. In the spirit of the collaborative
open source approach, I will forego an independent classification of my own and rely
instead on a “taxonomy of licenses” formulated by Lawrence Rosen.240 Rosen
classifies open source licenses into four categories: Academic Licenses, Reciprocal
Licenses, Standards Licenses, and Content Licenses.241 The BSD license, introduced
above, is an academic license and is probably the least restrictive open source license.
The GPL, also discussed above, is a reciprocal license and is much more restrictive.
Although these two licenses share in the early academic history of the open source
approach, they also represent the genesis of two separate factions of the open source
community. Richard Stallman, author of the GPL, argues that the BSD license is
anathema to the ideals of the original “free software” community. Stallman, and his
compatriots at the FSF, might be described as software moralists. They believe that
restricting access to source code is both morally wrong and inefficient.242 The BSD
license permits such restrictions by allowing licensees that create derivative works to
distribute their work under any license, including proprietary licenses. Richard
Stallman explains the difference between his free software movement and the open
source approach this way:
Free software and open source are the slogans of two different movements with
different philosophies. In the free software movement, our goal is to be free to share
and cooperate. We say that non-free software is antisocial because it tramples the
users’ freedom, and we develop free software to escape from that.

238. Quittmeyer, supra note 93, at 909 (“Typically, vendors of software programs transact business by
‘licensing’ rather than ‘selling’ software.”).
239. At present there are nearly sixty licenses approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI) and listed
on their website. These licenses are available at http://www.opensource.org/licenses (last visited Sept. 16,
2005). OSI is one of several organizations dedicated to the promotion of open source software. See infra
notes 273-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of OSI and the Open Source Definition.
240. See ROSEN, supra note 105, at 51.
241. Id. at 69-71.
Academic licenses, so named because such licenses were originally created by academic
institutions to distribute their software to the public, allow the software to be used for any
purpose whatsoever with no obligation on the part of the licensee to distribute the source
code of derivative works. . . . Academic licenses create a public commons of free software,
and anyone can take such software for any purpose—including for creating proprietary
collective and derivative works—without having to add anything back to that commons.
Id. at 69-70. “Reciprocal licenses also allow software to be used for any purpose whatsoever, but they
require the distributors of derivative works to distribute those works under the same license, including the
requirement that the source code of those derivative works be published.” Id. at 70. “Standards licenses
are designed primarily for ensuring that industry standard software and documentation be available to all
for implementation of standard products.” Id. “Content licenses ensure that copyrightable subject matter
other than software, such as music, art, film, literary works, and the like, be available to all for any purpose
whatsoever.” Id. at 71.
242. “Free software is a matter of freedom: people should be free to use software in all the ways that are
socially useful.” Philosophy of the GNU Project, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/philosophy.html#About
FreeSoftware (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
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The open source movement promotes what they consider a technically superior
development model that usually gives technically superior results. The values they
cite are the same ones Microsoft appeals to: narrowly practical values.
Free software and open source are also both criteria for software licenses. These
criteria are written in very different ways but the licenses accepted are almost the
same. The main difference is the difference in philosophy. Why does the philosophy
matter?
Because people who don’t value their freedom will lose it. If you give people
freedom but don’t teach them to value it, they won’t hold on to it for long. So it is not
enough to spread free software. We have to teach people to demand freedom, to fight
for freedom. Then we may be able to overcome the problems that today I see no way
to solve.243

Stallman’s GPL achieves this freedom by requiring all licensees to distribute GPL
licensed code, or any derivative work, under the GPL. Specifically, section 2(b) states
that “[y]ou must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in part
contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole
at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License.”244 Rosen describes
this provision as reciprocal because it imposes an obligation upon the licensee that
chooses to distribute GPL code or any derivative program.245 Section 2(b) is also
described as the “copyleft provision” and pejoratively as the “viral provision.” Open
source advocates call this provision “copyleft” because it uses copyright law to ensure
that source code remains open for downstream users.246 Open source opponents call
this provision “viral” because it can potentially infect a software development project
that incorporates GPL licensed source code.247 This is a potential pitfall awaiting
programmers that want to take their software project private and license it under a
proprietary license.248 As commercial software developers consider utilizing open
source software, this aspect of the GPL license is a serious concern. In the absence of

243. Interview: Richard Stallman, http://kerneltrap.org/node/4484 (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
244. GNU General Public License, Version 2, Section 2(b) (1991) http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
(last visited Apr. 16, 2005) (emphasis added).
245. ROSEN, supra note 105, at 70 (“The GPL license, written by Richard Stallman and Eben Moglen
at the Free Software Foundation, is the archetypal reciprocal license. Anyone who creates and distributes
a derivative work of a work licensed under a reciprocal license must, in turn, license that derivative work
under the same license.”).
246. One commentator explains:
[C]opyleft licenses provide that you may distribute the open source code and any
modifications to it, but only under the same open source license under which you received
it. In this way, as the code and modifications to it pass from person to person or entity to
entity, they remain open source. This ingenious tactic is embodied in the GPL, but not the
BSD license.
Nadan, supra note 7, at 357-58.
247. See Vetter, supra note 3, at 633-34.
248. One author warns that “if you incorporate some GPL code in your proprietary software product,
arguably your whole proprietary product becomes open source and must be licensed by you under the GPL.
This illustrates the importance of fully understanding open source licensing before deploying it in a
commercial context.” Nadan, supra note 7, at 359. Nadan concludes that the GPL license “must be used
very cautiously” and suggests that for commercial developers the BSD license may be a better approach.
Id. at 361.
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any judicial guidance, the literature is rife with ruminations about the appropriate scope
and enforceability of this provision.249
VII. LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES
Perhaps the most glaring aspect of open source licensing is the near complete
dearth of litigation concerning the validity of open source licenses. In 2001, one open
source commentator wrote that “[i]t is important to note that no cases have been
decided that directly interpret any of the Open Source licenses or the particular issues
arising under specific licenses . . . . In other words, there are only questions with regard
to the legal issues involving Open Source licenses, not any definitive answers.” 250
With some minor exceptions, the legal landscape of open source software has not
changed.251 Practitioners and academics in the open source arena are currently
operating in a kind of legal vacuum, devoid of any judicial guidance concerning the
legitimacy of open source licenses. Eben Moglen, co-author of the GPL, has
emphasized recently that the Free Software Foundation has been able to enforce the
GPL without resorting to litigation.252
Despite Moglen’s comments, the GPL is not likely to remain unchallenged for
long. Unless and until courts have this opportunity to weigh in, or states resolve the
issue by adopting a uniform code, questions will remain. While the recent commercial
success of Linux and other open source projects suggest that this lack of certainty has
not inhibited progress, one can only speculate how many interested parties are waiting
on the sidelines until some of the questions are resolved.
It is worth noting that a recent lawsuit has the potential to change this barren legal
landscape. In recent months there has been much discussion about the pending litigation between the SCO Group (SCO) and IBM and the potential impact this case may
have on the open source movement.253 After a failed collaborative software development arrangement between the two companies, SCO claimed that IBM misappropriated
proprietary Unix source code by including parts of the code in IBM’s version of the

249. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Allchin’s Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source
Software, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491 (2002); Nadan, supra note 7, at 369 (arguing that the GPL
may constitute a misuse of copyright); Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451 (2005) (rebutting various arguments that the GPL is
unenforceable).
250. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 368.
251. The GPL has been raised as a secondary issue in a few cases in the U.S., but courts have not yet
been required to rule on its enforceability. See Wacha, supra note 249, at 454.
252. Moglen explains:
For ten years, I did all of the GPL enforcement work around the world by myself, while
teaching full time at a law school. It was not hard, really; the defendant in court would have
had no license, or had to choose affirmatively to plead my license: they did not choose that
route. Indeed they did not choose to go to court; they cooperated, that was the better way.
My client did not want damages, my client wanted compliance. My client did not want
publicity, my client wanted compliance. We settled for compliance all the time. We got
compliance all the time.
Moglen, supra note 176, at 7.
253. See Kerry D. Goettsch, SCO Group v. IBM: The Future of Open-Source Software, 2003 U. ILL. J.
L. TECH. & POL’Y 581.
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Linux operating system.254 In addition to its legal claims against IBM, SCO has also
sent notice to scores of IBM’s Linux customers threatening copyright infringement
suits unless they pay licensing fees to SCO.255 At present it remains unclear whether
this lawsuit will implicate the GPL license under which Linux is distributed. One
author suggests:
[C]ourts could potentially invalidate the GPL, regardless of the ultimate outcome of
the suit against IBM, since SCO’s case is not wholly dependent on the issue. This
would have an enormous effect on the development of all types of open-source
software. At the same time, the courts may dodge the issue entirely or even affirmatively validate the GPL, both of which could be seen as positive outcomes for the
open-source community.256

Any judicial guidance regarding the enforceability of the Linux GPL license would be
helpful. Yet, this would not resolve the issue of different interpretations among
different courts. This dispute exemplifies the potential chilling effect that legal
uncertainty can have on the open source movement.
Much of the legal uncertainty regarding open source software relates to the basic
question of whether open source licenses are enforceable contracts or merely bare
licenses. To the extent that open source licenses are deemed to be enforceable
contracts, licensors will benefit from stronger enforcement of specific license terms and
provisions. As noted above, however, a license is not necessarily a contract. A bare
license is merely permission authorizing others to exercise rights that would otherwise
be prohibited by law.257 For example, a driver’s license authorizes the licensee to drive
on public roads, which would otherwise be prohibited by law.258 Unlike a contract, this
type of bare license does not create any bilateral obligation between the two parties.
In the context of software, the author of a software program owns the copyright in that
program and this property right is recognized and protected by the Copyright Act. As
such, the author enjoys certain exclusive rights such as the right to makes copies of the
program and the right to distribute those copies.
As an example, consider a programmer, Anne, who has written a useful software
program. Anne wants to allow friends to use the program for personal use, but restrict
them from distributing copies to others. Anne could give her friends limited
permission to make copies for themselves only, but not grant permission to distribute.
If Anne’s friend, Donna, were to make and use a personal copy, that would be
permitted by the license. However, if Donna made a copy and sent it to a friend, Chris,
then Donna would be exceeding the scope of her license and would be liable for
infringing on Anne’s exclusive distribution right. This same arrangement could also
be structured as a contract if the parties wished. Anne could offer to Donna a
permission to make a personal copy of the program in exchange for $10. If Donna
accepts the offer, and pays Anne the $10, a contract is formed. The only difference
here is the offer, acceptance, and the $10 consideration. This minor difference does,

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 587.
ROSEN, supra note 105, at 53.
Id. at 51.
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however, alter the arrangement significantly. First, the contractual arrangement
provides an additional cause of action for Anne, if Donna subsequently sends an
additional copy to Chris. Anne could sue Donna for copyright infringement as above,
but she could also sue for breach of contract, provided the terms of the agreement are
clear enough. The contract also protects Donna by making the copying permission
irrevocable and creating a cause of action against Anne in the case of a breach.
One prominent open source advocate, Lawrence Rosen, suggests that “it is safer
for a licensor and his licensees to enter into enforceable contracts.”259 Presumably, it
is safer because both parties are mutually obligated by the terms of the contract. This
reduces the risk of unanticipated revocation by the licensor and ideally creates mutual
expectations about the arrangement. Rosen also points out that under contract law,
there are rules and procedures for interpreting vague or ambiguous terms in an agreement and for filling in gaps where the agreement is silent.260 This fosters uniformity
and certainty with respect to license interpretation. Despite Rosen’s preference for
contract, the FSF has remained adamant that their license, the GPL, is a bare license,
not a contract.261 The GPL, however, is not just a mere permission. It imposes
obligations upon licensees that must be accepted in order to exercise the rights granted
in the license.262 The most obvious example of such an obligation is the copyleft
requirement to license any derivative work under the GPL. Given these obligations,
many have suggested that the GPL would likely be interpreted as a contract, not a bare
license.263
If the GPL and other open source licenses are considered contracts, as many
commentators believe, they must meet specific requirements to be enforceable. Under
contractual analysis, there must be an offer, an acceptance, and consideration for the
license to be an enforceable contract.264 Several commentators have suggested that the
licenses themselves may be completely unenforceable based on traditional contract
doctrine of offer and acceptance. Similar to the debate about shrinkwrap and clickwrap licensing agreements, it is questionable whether open source licenses involve the
kind of acceptance that is required under contract law. One author suggests that when
compared with traditional shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements, some open source
licenses are less likely to be enforced because of a lack of notice of license terms.265

259. Id. at 56.
260. Id. at 57-58.
261. Wacha, supra note 249, at 456. Eben Moglen of the FSF has explained that “[t]he GPL, however,
is a true copyright license: a unilateral permission, in which no obligations are reciprocally required by the
licensor.” The GPL is a License, Not a Contract, Which is Why the Sky Isn’t Falling, GROKLAW,
December 14, 2003, http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20031214210634851.
262. Wacha, supra note 249, at 456.
263. Id. One wonders why the FSF would prefer to call the GPL a bare license instead of a contract.
It is quite possible that they want to avoid any warranties and liabilities that would be implied into the
contract by application of the UCC or, potentially, UCITA. This, however, is mere speculation on my part.
264. ROSEN, supra note 105, at 59.
265. Nadan explains:
Rather than requiring acceptance of a clickwrap agreement for downloads from a website,
acceptance of a clickwrap license that pops up during installation of the code, or acceptance
of a shrinkwrap license included in the packaging, the open source licenses just require that
a notice about the license be provided in or with the code. No manifestation of assent is
required to prove the licensee agreed to the terms, and indeed the user can access the code
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If the licensee or user has no notice of the licensing agreement, they cannot be contractually bound by the agreement. This might become a problem if, for example, Donna
creates a derivative work based on a GPL licensed program written by Anne. If Donna
obtained the source code without notice of the GPL terms and then decided to license
the derivative work to others using a proprietary license, in direct violation of the
copyleft provision, then Anne may have no cause of action for breach of contract. The
FSF would likely respond that this, however, does not foreclose the possibility of a
copyright infringement claim; and they are probably right. The copyright exists
regardless of whether a contract has been formed between the licensee and licensor.
Nevertheless, for open source licensors that want the support of contract law, they must
ensure that the transaction includes the required offer, acceptance, and consideration.
Nadan suggests that “[o]ne initial solution is to set up the code download site so that
the user is forced to click ‘I accept’ to a clickwrap form of the GPL before downloading.”266 This would ensure that notice of the GPL terms are provided before the
source code can be obtained. As mentioned above, to the extent that these types of
agreements are enforceable as contracts, this would bolster the likelihood of open
source license enforcement. Yet, even the enforceability of clickwrap agreements is
not free from all doubt.
Even if open source licenses in general are considered to be enforceable contracts,
some specific open source provisions may still be held unenforceable on a number of
different grounds. Several commentators have argued that the copyleft provision of
the GPL in particular is one such provision and might be void as a misuse of
copyright.267 Copyright misuse is an equitable defense to a copyright infringement
action. A finding of copyright misuse would preclude enforcement of the copyright
where the copyright holder is engaging in conduct—usually by contract—that expands
the scope of protection beyond the statutory rights granted in the Copyright Act.268
Christian Nadan argues that:
The copyleft provision purports to infect independent, separate works that are not
derivative of the open source code, and requires that such independent works be
licensed back to the licensor and the entire world under the GPL. The Copyright Act
does not give the copyright owner rights to such independent nonderivative works.
Attempting to extract such rights exceeds the scope of the copyright.269

The idea that the copyleft provision might be considered a misuse was certainly not
beyond the consideration of Moglen and Stallman. Accordingly, they include the

without ever seeing the license, let alone agreeing to it. This greatly increases the risk that
no license agreement has been formed.
Nadan, supra note 7, at 362.
266. Id. at 367. In general, courts have been willing to enforce these clickwrap agreements, but have
not agreed on a consistent mode of analysis. See supra Part IV.
267. See, e.g., Nadan, supra note 7, at 367.
268. See id. Courts first applied copyright misuse by analogy to the judicially recognized defense of
patent misuse. Nadan provides, as an example of patent misuse, “a contract that requires a patent licensee
to continue to pay royalties beyond the statutory term of the patent. A patent generally lasts for 20 years
from its filing date. Demanding royalties after the patent expired would exceed the scope of the rights
granted in a patent.” Id. at 367-68.
269. Id. at 369.
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following disclaimer in the GPL: “[I]t is not the intent of this section to claim rights or
contest your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to exercise the
right to control the distribution of derivative or collective works based on the
Program.”270 Whether this disclaimer shields a copyright misuse defense remains
unclear and would probably require a relatively fact-specific analysis. The point here
is that even if open source licenses are generally enforceable, some specific provisions
therein may not be. Moreover, even if the copyleft provision is found to be an
enforceable license term, there is still uncertainty about the extent to which it can bind
downstream users of GPL licensed code.
At present, many within the open source community are also concerned with the
proliferation of licenses.271 As previously mentioned, there are currently nearly sixty
separate licenses approved by the Open Source Initiative (OSI).272 The OSI is a selfappointed standards organization that has attempted to offer some organization to the
inherently decentralized open source approach. The OSI evaluates and certifies
licenses for compliance with their Open Source Definition.273 Despite the large and

270. GNU General Public License, Version 2, Section 2 (1991), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html.
271. “[T]he Linux and open source software industry is facing some of its biggest challenges in
containing the proliferation of its own licenses . . . .” Jay Lyman, License issues lining up for Linux, open
source, NEWSFORGE, Feb. 4, 2005, http://software.newsforge.com/article.pl?sid=05/02/03/206216.
272. See supra note 239.
273. The Open Source Definition provides that:
Open source doesn’t just mean access to the source code. The distribution terms of opensource software must comply with the following criteria:
1. Free Redistribution
The license shall not restrict any party from selling or giving away the software as a
component of an aggregate software distribution containing programs from several different
sources. The license shall not require a royalty or other fee for such sale.
2. Source Code
The program must include source code, and must allow distribution in source code as
well as compiled form. Where some form of a product is not distributed with source code,
there must be a well-publicized means of obtaining the source code for no more than a
reasonable reproduction cost–preferably, downloading via the Internet without charge. The
source code must be the preferred form in which a programmer would modify the program.
Deliberately obfuscated source code is not allowed. Intermediate forms such as the output
of a preprocessor or translator are not allowed.
3. Derived Works
The license must allow modifications and derived works, and must allow them to be
distributed under the same terms as the license of the original software.
4. Integrity of The Author’s Source Code
The license may restrict source-code from being distributed in modified form only if
the license allows the distribution of “patch files” with the source code for the purpose of
modifying the program at build time. The license must explicitly permit distribution of
software built from modified source code. The license may require derived works to carry
a different name or version number from the original software.
5. No Discrimination Against Persons or Groups
The license must not discriminate against any person or group of persons.
6. No Discrimination Against Fields of Endeavor
The license must not restrict anyone from making use of the program in a specific field
of endeavor. For example, it may not restrict the program from being used in a business, or
from being used for genetic research.
7. Distribution of License
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growing number of OSI certified licenses, the vast majority of open source projects
rely on either the BSD license or the GPL.274 Although license proliferation is one
indicia of the success of the open source movement, it does present some problems.
First and foremost is the problem of license incompatibility. The propagation of many
different and incompatible licenses frustrates programmers that want to share their
source code with each other.275 This would negate one of the primary benefits of the
open source approach: the ability to recycle existing source code into new open source
projects. Several authors have been consistently critical of this state of affairs and
warned that disorganization could lead to problems. In addressing the issue of open
source license proliferation, one author commented that “[t]here are a multitude of
licenses that purport to meet the goals of open source development. These licenses
reflect different, and sometimes contradictory, approaches to core licensing issues.
Many of the licenses are buggy—out of date, misapplied, misunderstood and hopelessly confusing. This state of affairs benefits no one.”276 That same author recommends a standards organization to bring certainty and uniformity to the open source
licensing regime, but is skeptical of the OSI’s capability in this regard.277 The OSI,
nevertheless, recognizes that license proliferation is a concern and has recently taken
steps to remedy the problem. The OSI is currently considering proposals to add three
new criteria to the evaluation and certification process that should limit the number of

The rights attached to the program must apply to all to whom the program is
redistributed without the need for execution of an additional license by those parties.
8. License Must Not Be Specific to a Product
The rights attached to the program must not depend on the program’s being part of a
particular software distribution. If the program is extracted from that distribution and used
or distributed within the terms of the program’s license, all parties to whom the program is
redistributed should have the same rights as those that are granted in conjunction with the
original software distribution.
9. License Must Not Restrict Other Software
The license must not place restrictions on other software that is distributed along with
the licensed software. For example, the license must not insist that all other programs
distributed on the same medium must be open-source software.
10. License Must Be Technology-Neutral
No provision of the license may be predicated on any individual technology or style
of interface.
Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2005)
(“rationale” sections omitted).
274. “While there are more than fifty OSI-approved licenses only a handful of those are actually in wide
use; in fact, just two licenses (GPL and BSD) cover over 70% of all projects.” Open Source Initiative,
http://www.opensource.org/docs/policy/licenseproliferation.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
275. See Stephen Shankland, Open-source overseer proposes paring license list, TECHREPULIC, Mar.
3, 2005, http://techrepublic.com.com/5100-22_11-5598102.html?part=rss&tag=feed&subj=tr# (“[Some
experts] argue that having numerous licenses leads to numerous islands of incompatible open-source code.
That means programmers can’t share as much of their work. And, of course, it means those thinking of
participating must spend more time understanding new licenses.”).
276. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75,
76 (2002).
277. Id. at 77, 82.
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additional licenses that will be certified.278 This does not, however, solve the problem
of the many open source licenses already being used.
A. UCITA and Open Source
The open source movement’s relative success is perhaps even more impressive
and surprising when one considers all of the legal questions that are yet to be resolved.
To what extent would a uniform code such as UCITA promote or hinder the continuing
development of open source licensing? There is certainly no unanimous response to
this question, but for the most part, open source proponents were not in favor of
UCITA. If, as most commentators believe, UCITA is applicable to open source
licenses, one author suggests that “UCITA may imply terms contrary to the intent of
the authors of a particular Open Source license. In particular, UCITA might imply
terms relating to duration of the license, warranties and other restrictions.”279 When
asked about his reaction to UCITA, Richard Stallman responded critically by saying
that “UCITA would make it harder for us to avoid liability for bugs that turn up in free
software we develop . . . . This is grossly unfair.”280 Stallman added that “UCITA
would also give proprietary software developers a way to prohibit reverse engineering.”281 Others have echoed Stallman’s claim that UCITA would have a detrimental
effect on the open source approach. Shawn Potter suggests that “the UCITA is far
from being an open source booster. Depending on the language state legislatures
adopt, the UCITA can as easily invalidate open source click-wrap licenses. The
UCITA also poses other threats to open source software development regarding
warranties and reverse engineering.”282
Interestingly, concerns about reverse engineering appear to be a little outdated.
As indicated earlier, UCITA’s proscription of reverse engineering was amended in
2002. Perhaps more significantly, UCITA was also amended to provide an exemption
from certain implied warranties for “free software.”283 Thus, the new UCITA now
appears to favor “free software” over proprietary software, at least with respect to

278. See Shankland, supra note 275 (“[T]he new proposed provisions would require that a license not
duplicate existing licenses; that it be clearly written, simple and understandable; and that it be reusable by
moving the names of specific individuals, projects or organizations into an accompanying attachment.”).
279. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 369.
280. Robert Lemos, Interview: GNU Guru Richard Stallman, ZDNET NEWS, Mar. 11, 2000,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-519022.html?legacy+zdnn.
281. Id.
282. Potter, supra note 6, ¶ 93.
283. Section 410 of UCITA now reads:
NO IMPLIED WARRANTIES FOR FREE SOFTWARE.
(a) [Free software defined.] In this section, “free software” means a computer program with
respect to which the licensor does not intend to make a profit from the distribution of the
copy of the program and does not act generally for commercial gain derived from controlling
use of the program or making, modifying, or redistributing copies of the program.
(b) [Implied warranties inapplicable.] The warranties under Sections 401 and 403 do not
apply to free software.
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 410 (amended 2002), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm. Section 401 covers implied warranties for noninfringement and
noninterference. Id. § 401. Section 403 provides an implied warranty of merchantability. Id. § 403.
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implied warranties. These developments would seem to call for a reevaluation of
UCITA from the open source community. Additionally, even if UCITA itself is dead
in the water, the exemption from implied warranties for free software indicates that the
open source approach is now on the radar of the NCCUSL.
Concededly, UCITA is not a magic pill. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that
at least some uncertainties could be clarified by a uniform code, such as UCITA. Open
source licenses are similar to shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses in that they are
standard form agreements that rely on the notice-plus-conduct model of contract
formation discussed above. One author argues that the open source movement is
dependent upon the validity of these “non-negotiated, standard-form, take-it-or-leave-it
mass-market licenses.”284 Several authors insist that “UCITA, if adopted by the states,
could help resolve some of the uncertainty regarding open source licenses.”285 These
licenses—if enforced as contracts—allow software developers to disclaim implied
warranties and shift the risk of liability for damages and infringement to the licensee.
To the dismay of consumer advocates, UCITA would have validated these license
terms and enforced them as contractual terms. Many critics viewed this treatment as
unfairly deferential to the interests of large commercial software developers, such as
Microsoft. This critique is by no means groundless. Microsoft would indeed benefit
from contractual treatment of clickwrap and shrinkwrap license agreements. This was
true in 1999, when UCITA was first offered to the states, and it is true today. But the
commercial software landscape has been altered by the emergence of open source
software. Now we must consider not only the benefits that UCITA would offer to
Microsoft, but also the benefits it would offer to the open source movement. To the
extent that UCITA would benefit the open source approach, it should be welcomed,
regardless of its effect on Microsoft.
Enforcement of warranty and liability disclaimers was a particularly controversial
aspect of UCITA. However, the emergence of the open source approach requires a
rethinking of why these terms should be enforced. The ability of open source licensors
to include these terms in their license agreements is crucial to the vitality of the open
source movement.286 Because of the collaborative nature of the open source
development model, hundreds or even thousands of programmers contribute source
code to open source projects. Liability for infringement and implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are potentially substantial
disincentives to contribution to open source projects.287 Individual programmers that
contribute on their own time for little direct reward would be foolish to risk exposing
themselves to this liability. Obviously, the NCCUSL recognized this issue and
responded by exempting distributors of free software from some of the implied
warranties. At present, it remains unclear whether warranty and liability disclaimers
for open source software will be enforced. UCITA would not only clarify this issue,

284. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 178, at 190.
285. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 183, at 678.
286. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 178, at 191.
287. Id. at 192 (“If free software authors lose the right to disclaim all warranties and find themselves
getting sued over the performance of the programs that they’ve written, they’ll stop contributing free
software to the world. It’s to our advantage as users to help the author protect this right.” (quoting Bruce
Perens, author of the Open Source Definition) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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but would give free software developers a leg up on proprietary developers by
exempting them from certain implied warranties.
Of particular concern for commercial software developers is the impact of the
copyleft provision of the GPL and other reciprocal licenses. Several authors have
expressed concern that copyleft is a trap for the unwary commercial developer because
it could contaminate an entire software project and force it to be distributed under the
GPL.288 No doubt, developers that have dipped their toes into the open source waters
should make themselves keenly aware of this issue. Yet, there is no judicial guidance
on whether this term is enforceable and, if so, to what extent it can bind downstream
users. In its current form, UCITA does not specifically address this issue.
Nevertheless, its deference to, and enforcement of, license terms would validate the
copyleft provision as long as certain notice requirements are satisfied. The copyleft
provision is more likely to be enforced under UCITA. However, UCITA would also
require open source developers and distributors to conform their distribution practices
to its requirements. This would ensure that licensees have notice of copyleft license
terms before formation of an enforceable contract. In this sense, UCITA would
promote uniformity and certainty with regard to the distribution method of open source
software.
Enactment of UCITA would not directly solve the problem of license
proliferation. Nevertheless, it would provide clear rules for open source developers
and help them make informed decisions when choosing a particular license. It would
also assist open source standards organizations such as the OSI by providing clear rules
regarding when and under what conditions open source licenses would be enforceable.
One could argue that the open source approach in general, and copyleft in
particular, suggests that our current intellectual property regime fails to strike an
appropriate balance between propertizing intellectual creations and sustaining a robust
public domain of freely available information. There is, of course, a paradox
embedded somewhere here. Whatever balance is achieved by pure intellectual
property law is tilted in favor of creators and against public access by the use of
licenses. Open source software emerges from a culture of free and open access to
information, yet exists in and is sustained by the copyright and license regimes. As one
author points out, “[t]o promote the open source model, it appears, is to accept the
legitimacy of licensing models that the open source model is designed to oppose.”289
Perhaps copyright law should provide an alternative mechanism for authors that wish
to make their works freely available, instead of resorting to the copyright-and-thenlicense approach that the current open source movement utilizes. At present, however,
the open source movement does rely on the copyright-then-license regime.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It should now be apparent that the open source movement has provided society
with innovative and valued software projects including Linux, Apache, and many
others. Open source software has contributed to the progress of the new information

288. See, e.g., Thomas M. Pitegoff, Open Source, Open World: New Possibilities for Computer
Software in Business, BUS. L. TODAY, Sep./Oct. 2001, at 52, 55.
289. Madison, supra note 12, at 275-76.
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society and has provided a foundation for economic growth. This has occurred despite
the substantial legal uncertainties looming over the open source licensing regime. To
the extent that the open source movement has the potential to provide society with free
public goods, it should be supported by law and public policy.290
A uniform law, such as UCITA, could potentially benefit the open source
movement by generally validating the licensing regime it relies upon and enforcing
warranty and liability disclaimers. The UCITA experience represents one effort to
address a species of transaction that is becoming omnipresent in our new information
economy—the licensing of computer information. Despite the controversy
surrounding its drafting and the opposition to its adoption, UCITA is, at the very least,
a resource for thinking about the kinds of issues that should be confronted when
dealing with transactions in information.291 Although reports of UCITA’s demise have
been ongoing and frequent, these reports might be overstated. Adoption of the UCC
was at least as controversial as UCITA has been, but the need for uniformity and
clarity in commercial law ultimately led to its acceptance and adoption. Given the
ubiquity of the software license transaction in our modern economy, there is pressing
need for uniformity and clarity in this area as well.
To the extent that positive law—in the form of a uniform code—should be
informed by accepted customs, trade usages, and commercial practices, the open
source movement represents an important normative consideration. Regardless of
whether the open source approach is a rebirth of original programming tradition292 or
the emergence of a new software development paradigm, it deserves our attention.
Some have suggested that computer information transactions have not matured to the
point where trade usages, customs, and practices are sufficiently well established to
provide a foundation for codification. It has been argued that, at present, it is too early
to impose a positive uniform code because of the nascent nature of software and
information transaction practices. One author explains that “[i]n many industries
which would be governed by [UCITA], it is premature to refer to a usage of trade.
Customs are rapidly evolving, and deference to a particular norm at a particular time
may not be appropriate.”293 The open source movement might support this position in
that it represents a paradigm shift in the software development industry. This kind of
laissez-faire approach, however, fails to recognize and adequately respond to the everincreasing advance of technology and the impact of that advance on our legal system.
The momentum of technological innovation will necessarily force more frequent and
imaginative legal evolution.294 Additionally, although there is some dispute about the
degree of overlap between commercial practices in the sales of goods context and
commercial practices in the licensing of information context, existing commercial law

290. At least one author agrees. “Linux’s development and success prove that ‘open-source’
programming can produce reliable, technologically sound software with remarkable speed. Viewed in this
context, it is vitally important that the law support, even encourage, the development of ‘open-source’
software.” Bobko, supra note 196, at 84.
291. Boss, supra note 135, at 127.
292. Potter, supra note 6, ¶ 7 (“In a way, open source is the re-emergence of the original software
distribution model.”).
293. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic
Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 635, 651 (1999).
294. That is “evolution,” not “revolution.”
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has already laid some of the necessary foundation for a uniform code to govern
software licensing. Finally, the open source movement shows us that even a constituency that was strongly opposed to adoption of UCITA embraces the licensing regime
that UCITA also embraces. It is true that the open source approach shifts the paradigm
with respect to sharing of source code. However, much like proprietary software
developers, open source developers utilize standard form clickwrap and shrinkwrap
licenses to control downstream use of their software. In light of the emergence of the
open source movement and its reliance on the software licensing regime, it is now time
for the ALI and the states to reconsider UCITA.
Matthew D. Stein

